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ABSTRACT
The French Expeditionary Corps that fought in Italy during World War II was a
French army, but that description must be qualified. Therefore this thesis asks two
questions: how did France manage to send the equivalent of an army to Italy if French
military leadership in 1943 had no direct access to French manpower resources; and the
most important question since it is unique to the historical debate, why were the troops
that were sent to Italy so effective once there when compared to the 1940 French army?
To answer the first question, it was a French colonial army – soldiers mainly from Africa
– that enabled France to send an army to Italy. The second question was not so easily
addressed and is actually composed of two parts: current scholarship finds that at the
tactical level French troops of 1940 no less capable than the troops in Italy, but more
importantly it was the French military leadership’s willingness to expend the lives of
their colonial solders with little regard that allowed the French Expeditionary Corps to
allow the United States Fifth Army to enter Rome just days before the Allied invasion of
Normandy. And in order to understand why the French military was willing to expend
the lives of its African soldiers, this thesis also had to examine the French colonial system
dating to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Finally, this paper explores the
different components of leadership that each army, which were African (primarily from
North Africa and French West Africa) and metropolitan (mostly from European France),
used to lead and direct their men. Thus, this study is more than just a pure military
history. It is also a cultural and social history of France in relation to its colonies.
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INTRODUCTION
Two Allied armies fought up the Italian peninsula from September 1943 until the
end of hostilities in May 1945: the United States Fifth Army and the British Eighth
Army. While these two armies and their leaders were the recipients of the glory that
followed the capture of the first of the major Axis capitals, Rome on 4 June 1944, they
were not completely homogeneous armies of American and British soldiers. Soldiers
from many other nations participated in the Italian campaign: India, New Zealand, South
Africa, Canada, Brazil, Poland, Greece, a newly formed Italian military fighting for the
Allies, and France. The focus of this study is on the last mentioned of these nations, the
soldiers from France; and “other” is the keyword because the passage of time since
World War II ended has allowed some of those “other” histories to be forgotten, while
“others” have never been adequately examined or explored.
In this study both “other” scenarios – forgotten and unexamined histories – apply.
Therefore, this thesis asks two questions. First, how did France manage to send the
equivalent of an army to fight in Italy if French military leadership had no direct access to
French manpower resources? It must be remembered that after France was defeated by
Germany in 1940, the French nation was only allowed (by Germany) to field a small
army to defend France and the colonies; and the remainder of France was completely
occupied by Axis forces in November 1942 after troops from the United States and Great
Britain invaded French North Africa. Second, and the most important question since it is
unique to the historical debate, is why were the troops that France did send to Italy so
effective once they were there?

1

There is an easy answer to the first question: France’s colonial empire allowed
France to reenter the fight against the Axis. However, this answer is too simplistic and
ignores many of the complex political disagreements within France that occurred during
and after June of 1940, i.e. General Charles de Gaulle’s radio address on the 18th of June
telling his fellow Frenchmen that France had lost a battle but not the war, in contrast to
General Philippe Pétain’s call for social stability through Travail, Famille, Patrie (Work,
Family, Fatherland). The net result of the French defeat in 1940 was that the Vichy
government had control of the bureaucratic and military apparatus in most of the France’s
colonies until the end of 1942, while the troops that rallied to de Gaulle numbered around
35,000 men until late 1942. It was only after the Western Allies invaded of North Africa
that a sizeable French military became a reality. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the
French army participating in the liberation of Italy was successful despite the racial
hierarchies and ethnic stereotypes that had been developed in over one hundred years of
recruiting in the colonial empire. In short the military units in Italy primarily had white
officers and non-commissioned officers while Africans made up the majority of the
infantry, which were those men in closest proximity to the enemy – the men seen and
shot at by the enemy. Thus, even though both, the army of 1940 and the army in 1943-44
were French, there was a difference in the composition of those armies. The 1940 army
was mostly comprised of soldiers recruited in France, although many Africans fought in
France in 1940, while the army that fought in Italy in 1943-44 was an army where the
majority of the men were recruited from Africa. 1 In sum, this thesis is bridging the gap
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In 1940 infantry divisions formed in Africa comprised over twenty percent – over 100,000 African men in

combat positions – of the total French infantry divisions facing Germany. These numbers do not include
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between France’s colonial history, using, for example, Gregory Mann’s Native Sons:
West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century, William Cohen’s French
Encounter with Africans: White Response to Blacks, 1530-1880, Patricia Lorcin’s
Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria, and Vichy
France, Robert Paxton’s groundbreaking Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order,
1940-1944, to link them with French military history during World War II, examining
Anthony Clayton’s France, Soldiers and Africa, Paul Gaujac’s Le Corps Expeditionnaire
Français En Italie, and Jacques Robichon’s Les Français En Italie: Le Corps
Expéditionnaire Français de Naples à Sienne, 1943-1944. 2 By having an understanding
of France’s colonial past as well as the complexities of France’s political situation in
1940, the relevance of the first question can be fully understood.
The answer to the second question has two plausible scenarios. The first
possibility, which is supported by scholarship over the past twenty years, is that France’s
military leadership during the 1940 campaign, at least at the lowest levels, was not as
completely inept as some early postwar studies would have us accept. Therefore, French
success in Italy should not be wholly unexpected. The second possibility is not so easily

the large number of African auxiliary workers who performed much needed work behind the front line. In
Italy, all the divisions had large numbers of Africans serving as infantry.
2
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determined; it relies on casualty figures from the 1943 and 1944 battles to determine if
some of the French success was on account of the French high-level leadership
willingness to guarantee success at all cost. In effect, was France more willing to
guarantee success by sacrificing its soldiers in Italy since they were soldiers from the
empire, i.e. they were not white Frenchmen? This question is the crux of this thesis. As
with the first question, since the army drew upon widely accepted racial hierarchies at the
tactical level, the second question addresses French leadership at the highest levels,
where decisions and decision makers were also imbued with these beliefs that had
developed over a century of French colonial conquest. General Alphonse Juin, the
commander of the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) in Italy, was born into a colonial
settler family in Algeria in the late nineteenth century and had grown up in the imperial
milieu. He was appointed the commander of France’s Moroccan troops prior to World
War I, and he therefore knew that his forces were capable of defeating the Germans
because it was an army created using the colonial system – units of which had performed
well in World War I and in 1940. Juin’s willingness to believe in his men’s abilities
created a powerful military instrument in Italy during 1943-44, but there was also a
negative component. Juin was not opposed to using his men for French glory or to prove
to doubters among the Allies (and elsewhere) that his troops could reinvigorate French
military glory.
The passing of sixty years, as I suggested earlier, does allow for different
interpretations of certain events in World War II, or in the case of this thesis, an original
question and unique answer to the French effort in Italy. British historian Norman
Davies, No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945, convincingly argues that

4

those events that transpired on the Eastern Front from 1941 through 1945 are paramount
in any study of World War II if one is to truly understand the war and its ramifications
after the war ended in May of 1945. 3 His argument is simply that many American and
British authors view the Mediterranean and Western Fronts as decisive to the defeat of
Germany as was the Eastern Front, which Davies argues is too simplistic. All the battles
and campaigns of World War II need to be placed into a proper perspective if a true
understanding of the war is ever going to be written. Thing such as the Allied air
campaign against Germany; Allied Lend-Lease that provided the Soviets with over
500,000 trucks (since their vehicle industry was incapable of manufacturing trucks and
tanks at the same time); the Allied and Japanese battles in the Pacific, and the Soviet
willingness to sacrifice millions of men in 1941 to remain at war, all need to be taken into
account and placed into a proper perspective.
No Simple Victory is, however, more than just an Eastern Front centered argument
that questions the importance of many aspects of the Western Front that have been
accepted as unassailable truths by many. The title is a play upon words, by which Davies
suggests that World War II was neither a simple victory for the Allies, nor an easy war to
describe or sum up. Davies writes:
In other words, it is not difficult to see that powerful myths have arisen that
override all accurate records or recollections of what actually happen in 19391945 … As time passes, uncritical attitudes appear to multiply as later generations
lose all sight of wartime complexities. 4
Returning to the French military participation in Italy, while some studies have been done
that illustrate the importance of the French, they have not always shown how or why this

3
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contribution to the Allied effort occurred. Why was it so successful? What was the final
price of this victory?
British author John Ellis, in Cassino, the Hollow Victory, describes the impact of
French soldiers upon the 1944 Italian battles, and specifically the leadership of General
Juin by calling General Juin’s concept for the May offensive, “a shining example of the
science of command, capabilities of the attacking troops optimally applied, and their
attacks consistently pressed home with the greatest panache.” 5 British historians
Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Tug of War, find the FEC so effective that they
name one of the sections of their book after the French contribution: France Wins the
Diadem. 6 These two balanced histories of the Italian Campaign illustrate the importance
of France, but they do not cover the metamorphosis of the seemingly hapless French
military formations fighting in 1940 to their exemplary combat performance in Italy
during 1944, i.e. how did we get from there to here – the proverbial phoenix rising from
the ashes.
This thesis must therefore examine some of the military histories that cover the
performance of the French in the 1940 battles. By understanding how the French combat
strategy at the lowest level, referred to as tactics, worked in 1940, this study can then
search for another possible reason – or at least one more factor – for the success of the
French in Italy during 1943-44. This examination is found in chapter one. Since some
5
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Line. The architect of the plan, British General A.F. “John” Harding, planned that Diadem would allow the
Allied armies to sweep up the Italian peninsula into the Po Valley during 1944 and eliminate one of the
German armies in Italy in the process. Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Tug of War: The Battle
for Italy: 1943-45 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).
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authors have just listed the exploits of the FEC, inferring that it was the same army that
fought for France in 1940, this study must also examine the men who did the actual
fighting and dying, those men from metropolitan France as well as the large number of
soldiers from France’s colonial empire. It must be understood that any examination of
France’s soldiers is complex. Moreover, French colonial history, with its peculiar
relationship with European France, is still a relatively new historiography and still under
construction. This examination is the focus of chapter two. Chapter three is the study of
the combat losses suffered by the FEC, and with some extrapolating it is possible to show
that the French military took large losses for its gains in Italy – losses taken primarily by
the troops indigenous to Africa. Chapter four is the analysis and some of the
ramifications of the soldier’s successes, which have mostly been overlooked, then and to
the present.
Therefore, by examining some of the battles of 1940 and 1943-44 and the men
who fought them, this thesis will determine what made the FEC such an effective fighting
force and a “shining example.” Was it a simple military change, such as a matter of
different leadership, or was it a human or social adjustment, the FEC relying on men
from Africa, or a combination of the two that provided victory in Italy for the FEC?

7

CHAPTER ONE: THE BATTLE FOR FRANCE, 1940
Winston Churchill proclaimed in the House of Commons on 23 March 1933,
“Thank God for the French army.” 7 His comments were an expression of the faith that
many in Great Britain, and for that matter many other citizens in Europe, placed upon the
French army to defend the status quo in Europe. 8 The one hundred (plus) divisions of the
French army of 1940 were, however, different from the army that General Henri-Philippe
Pétain had rallied with the 1916 battle cry, “They shall not pass!” 9 These differences are
many, sometimes far-reaching, and often very subtle: firepower replaced manpower, a
defensive rather than offensive strategy, and an increased reliance upon troops from the
empire. 10 Although this thesis is an examination of the French contribution to the Allied
effort in Italy during 1944, the happenings of 1940 must first be examined to understand
the transition from one campaign to the other.
The success or failure of French leadership in 1940 is one of the cornerstones for
this thesis, the antithesis of Ellis and the FEC being “a shining example of the science of
command” in 1944. One definition of leadership is described as “the process of

7
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Churchill’s remark was therefore not totally altruistic. The British government was one of the major

beneficiaries of a strong French military. A strong French army allowed Britain to spend money, or in
many cases not spend money, on the defense of faraway colonies. A large French navy guaranteed that the
Italian navy had a counterbalance; Britain could focus its naval assets on Japan and the United States.
9
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World War I where it took many months for sizable numbers of African divisions to reach the front, in
1940 France was ready to quickly transport African divisions to France as soon as war was declared – not
even counting the African divisions already stationed in France.
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influencing others.” 11 Another definition expands upon the “process” and states that
military leadership is “the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the
conditions for organizational success to accomplish missions effectively.” 12 Initially the
later definition seems obvious or simplistic, but upon further reflection it incorporates
some subtle concepts on how a leader of men might approach war. Direct influence is
the use of personal contact to move men and machines to accomplish the mission.
Indirect influence is not so easy to define since it includes things such as: issuing orders
down the chain of command (and how they are received and understood), regulations, or
standing operating procedures. In the issuing of orders, for example, does the
commander send his subordinate orders in great detail, or does he trust that a simple
command statement, even just one written sentence, will suffice? The German tradition
of Auftragstaktik (mission-oriented tactics) is an example of issuing very terse orders; the
German commander relies upon the subordinate commanders to understand the intent –
and intent is the key – of the orders received and achieving that goal even if it required
ignoring parts of the orders they had just received. 13 Standard operating procedures
included ways to command as well as tactics used to attack or defend. All these different
means of trying to obtain the same goal, to accomplish the mission effectively, explain

11
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long as the hill was taken. The French and British military tradition, in contrast, had subordinate
commanders normally receiving more detailed orders, such as how to deploy their men to take the hill,
from their commanding officers. The American tradition of command was somewhere in the middle of
these two systems.

9

why no two armies are ever the same. And that same army, fighting at two separate
times, even if separated by only a few years, is also a different organization. The role of
French leadership has become the final answer for many authors who have examined the
1940 campaign.
A balanced analysis that examines French leadership in 1940 is by Ernest May,
Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France, which traces its title directly to Marc
Bloch and his Strange Defeat. 14 Bloch, unlike May who has had over fifty years of
scholarship to build upon, was never in possession of all of the facts of the campaign
since he was executed by Germany before the war ended. 15 Bloch’s final conclusion
though, that most of the blame could be placed upon the French High Command, has
withstood the test of time. May, in full possession of much of the economic and military
data, can only conclude that Hitler was very lucky, and Germany’s victory was indeed
strange. May states:
France capitulated in 1940 because its armies were defeated in battles. Many
writers on the fall of France do not accept this simple-seeming assertion, for they
portray France’s defeats on the battlefield as the last gasps by a nation already
doomed. 16
Furthermore:
14

Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000). Marc

Bloch, Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940, trans. Gerard Hopkins (New York:
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impervious to the guns mounted on the German tanks while their cannons had no difficulty penetrating the
German armor. France also had more artillery than Germany. The one area where Germany had a major
materiel advantage was in aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. R.H.S. Stolfi, “Equipment for Victory in
France 1940,” History 55 (1970), 11.
16
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More than anything else, this happened because France and its allies misjudged
what Germany planned to do. If leaders in the Allied governments had
anticipated the German offensive through the Ardennes, even as a worrisome
contingency, it is almost inconceivable that France would have been defeated
when and as it was. It is more than conceivable that the outcome would have
been not France’s defeat by Germany’s and, possibly, a French victory parade on
the Unter den Linden in Berlin. 17
Simply, if many of the other excuses for a French defeat have been stripped away, such
as the bourgeoisie, elements of a supposed “fifth column,” or that the whole of French
society and the Third Republic was decadent and therefore unworthy of being saved, then
the cause of defeat was because the French army was defeated in battles that were
directed by its High Command. 18 Bloch states it more eloquently: “Whatever the deepseated causes of the disaster may have been, the immediate occasion was the utter
incompetence of the High Command.” 19 French leadership had prepared for one type of
battle, la bataille conduite (the methodical battle), which would have taken years to
defeat Germany, while the German’s High Command tweaked their concept of
Bewegungskrieg (war of movement) and eventually crafted a very different type of
warfare, known by many as the blitzkrieg, which is a type of warfare designed to avoid a
long war. 20 Economically, Germany’s leadership realized that Germany could not hope

17
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stated that, “Whether I was responsible for the winning of the Battle of the Marne I do not know, but of this
I feel pretty certain, that, had it been lost, the failure would have been laid at my door.” Bloch, Strange
Defeat, 25.
19
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was not a new type of warfare. One definition states: “It combined air power, tanks, and subversive
warfare actuated by dynamic command and control through radio and rapidly laid line communications …
aimed at the opposing side’s morale as concentrated land forces, supported by bombing, either broke
through or outflanked their defenses.”

The use of airplanes and tanks just created a faster
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to win a long war since France and Britain had more access to resources from around the
globe – material and manpower.
The ability to use the blitzkrieg requires one type of leadership, which fully
embraces the German tradition of Auftragstaktik – the intent. Eugenia C. Kiesling,
Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning, argues that the
French High Command, with many limitations imposed by the civilian government,
designed an army that fought a different type of warfare when compared to Germany. 21
The French High Command’s doctrine was not created for an ideal army, a small,
professional army that could quickly take the war to the enemy, but for the army that
France actually possessed. French officers designed the methodical doctrine so any
reserve officer could implement an attack regardless of the troops at hand since the
soldiers at the lowest level would have all had the same training using it.
The methodical battle, as the name suggests, was very ordered and could have
been successful in 1940 if Germany had given the France the opportunity to use it, but it
did have some glaring limitations when compared to the blitzkrieg. Before a French
attack could commence, the commander of the operation had to be sure that everything
was in place for the attack to proceed: men, armor, and artillery (and possibly airpower).
The infantry were assigned limited objectives, and the momentum of the attack was
dictated by their quickness. Tanks were supposed to get the infantry to their targets by
providing fire support as well as cover. After the infantry advanced one to two thousand
Bewegungskrieg, but the goal had always been – going back to Kingdom of Prussia – the creation of a
Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle) where the enemy’s army is destroyed, thereby keeping wars short. I.C.B.
Dear, editor, Oxford Companion to World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 140.
21
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meters, the attack halted to allow the artillery to adjust its fire. Another advance of one to
two thousand meters could then proceed. After the second advance, there was a lengthy
pause to allow the artillery to move forward, which allowed the whole process to begin
anew. While this type of advance was stingy in manpower and judicious in firepower, it
was very predictable and very slow. Since the French had over 1000 tanks available to
support the infantry divisions, not counting the 2000 tanks in the armor and cavalry
divisions, the French High Command knew that most attacks in 1940 would have at least
some armor support. But as Kiesling explains, Germany allowed few French attacks to
ever occur.
Kiesling states, “Both sides had to adapt to unexpected circumstances, but
improvision was encouraged among German soldiers and anathema among French
ones.” 22 In the end, it was the unexpected that spelled defeat for France. Whereas in the
German army that wanted the soldiers at the front to make decisions, again returning to
the concept of Auftragstaktik, which is guiding the attack from below, the French army
led attacks from the top. Even though French officers knew as early as the 13th of May
that significant German forces were moving through the Ardennes, it was up to General
Maurice Gamelin, commander of the Allied forces in France, to change the plan then in
effect. Gamelin’s hesitation proved disastrous. In sum, “The campaign took the turn it
did, at such enormous cost, because, in spite of two decades of effort, neither the French
army nor the nation it defended was ready for war.” 23 In this instance the French High
Command crafted a way of war, following a formula so reserve officers just had to follow

22
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a prescribed plan, to gain battlefield objectives with its citizen army. Events, however,
moved too quickly for the French High Command to use its strengths on the battlefield.
Robert Doughty, in Seeds of Disaster: the Development of French Army Doctrine,
1919-1939, like Kiesling, also supports the idea leadership played a large role in 1940. 24
Defeat could have been avoided but, “The French Army, in short, had formulated a
doctrine, organized and equipped its units, and trained its solders for the wrong type of
war.” 25 Doughty states that if the French army, i.e. its leadership, had developed an
operational strategy to take advantage of the German military involvement in Poland, or
organized its military units according to need, the outcome must have been different.
Doughty finds that equipment and organizational changes had modified the appearance of
the 1940 army from the 1918 army, but in a relative sense there had been a regression.
Modern weapons without a modern doctrine mean very little. The French army did have
the proper weapons on hand in 1940 to defend France, but it lacked the proper doctrine to
use those weapons. When a failed doctrine, la bataille conduite, is coupled with a failed
strategy, which was the rush of France’s best units into Belgium to keep the battles out of
France, the military disaster that befell France is easy to explain.
The studies examined so far have focused primarily on the role of leadership, but
the campaign in 1940 was also a battle of manpower. A later study by Robert Doughty,
Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940, examines one French division to
determine if the panic and subsequent collapse of this division is representative of the

24

Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: the Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939

(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985).
25

Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster, 3.

14

whole of the 1940 French army. 26 His study concluded that it was, and it was not. Many
of the men in this division were reservists who had completed their military service many
years previously. 27 That this division held a defensive line for as long as it did against
the elite units of the Germany army, the panzer troops, illustrates the determination of the
French to defend their country. That these men eventually broke and ran after trying to
repel three panzer divisions – and constant attacks by German aircraft – for two days was
understoodable. Doughty’s main point is that the weapons in use were important, and
from Seeds of Disaster they were “proper weapons,” but an even more significant factor
was the cohesion and leadership at the lowest levels of the military, which are those men
who are actually shooting and being shot at. Since the French strategy for the beginning
of the conflict was not to lose the war, many of the France’s soldiers were burdened with
digging trenches and strengthening bunkers during the “Phoney War,” rather than

26
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“tables of equipment” authorized. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster, 23.
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training for combat. 28 Doughty argues that these men should have been training to defeat
the style of war that Germany was practicing, a very rapid and deep drive into the French
rear areas, rather than hoping that their doctrine of defense, colmater (filling), would
work. 29 Doughty concludes:
The French expected to fight a carefully controlled, highly centralized battle, their
soldiers and units were not prepared for hasty counterattacks or audacious
maneuvers … the methodical battle may have succeeded against an enemy who
was the mirror image of the French, but it was completely inadequate against the
much more mobile and aggressive Germans. 30
What France needed was the ability of the lowest soldier to react – counterattack and
defend – to the German attack without an umbrella of artillery fire overhead, which the
methodical battle promised but could not always provide. Both of Doughty’s books
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argue that the troops at the front, the men who had to utilize the la bataille conduite and
colmater, were not ready.
Breaking Point is also very good about showing the link between strategy and
tactics, and on the importance of Auftragstaktik to the overall German victory. 31 The
German emphasis, in direct contrast to the French doctrine of having leaders in the rear
and attempting to manage the battle away from the fighting, was to have leaders in
forward positions and making instantaneous decisions that could have immediate
consequences on the battlefield. 32 Since German officers were closer to the shooting
than their French counterparts, their casualties were greater than those of their French
rivals. 33 One example, using Doughty’s study of the 55th Division at Sedan, nicely
illustrates the French attitude on the placement of leadership:
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enemy, so they could make decisions that instantly could alter the conditions on the battlefield. Taking the
example from footnote thirteen one step further, the German commander wants the hill taken, but the
commander at the front sees that bypassing the hill, and taking the town behind it, would accomplish the
same mission when the enemy has to retreat from the hill since it was no longer receiving supplies. France
preferred to have its commanders in their headquarters, receiving information from many different sources,
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The most important difference between the casualties of France and Germany
concerns the loss of key leaders. Of the four French battalions in the area
between Donchery and Pont Maugis, none lost its commander. Of the four
regiments involved in the fighting at Sedan, none lost its commander. Only one,
Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe of the 213th Infantry Regiment, was wounded, but
his wound came from German forces’ having broken through French defenses
between Chehéry and Chémery, not from his being forward. 34
Few casualties among French leadership is logical if they are the “handle of a fan” to
control the movement of their men – the officers were encouraged to remain in their
command posts. 35
May, Kiesling, and Doughty all find that the French army of 1940 possessed
strengths over Germany that just never had an opportunity to come into play. The High
Command had a plan for 1940 and the men to make the plan work, which was a
defensive strategy giving France time to bring more weapons and men to the battlefield,
and tactics (la bataille conduite and colmater) that the men could use. One of the
questions of this thesis is why were the troops that France sent to Italy so effective once
there? These authors find that France’s pre-war planning failed at the highest levels, and
this failure of leadership proved impossible to overcome even with capable men to follow
the orders, but they also suggest that at the lowest levels, especially Doughty in Breaking
Point, that the men were willing and able to fight German’s finest, even if those men
were not in France’s pre-war regular divisions. Furthermore, as a precursor to the next
chapter, some of the men from the African divisions felt betrayed, by their generals or
their own officers, at the spectacular collapse of 1940. As Gregory Mann states in Native
Sons:
attacked. Both procedures had strengths and weaknesses, and depending upon the battlefield, success on
one occasion could lead to terrible casualties the next.
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Some veterans of the Fall of France expected another round of fighting – one that
would give them a chance to redeem themselves. As a group of them reportedly
told the commandant of Kayes, … We were not beaten, but totally crushed ….
Contrary to what we had been told, our equipment was ridiculously insufficient.
We are brave, but a loser – whatever you say – is a always a slave (captif). We
are a warrior race (une race de guerriers) and we well never accept captivity. At
any rate, the war will resume in the spring of 1941, and we will win it. 36
Therefore, some successes in Italy should be expected by the FEC as the men were
willing to fight. Even though much of France was occupied by Germany in 1940,
Winston Churchill’s expression of faith in 1933 does not seem so quite misplaced. And
like Britain, France had one asset that allowed it effectively continue the war even if it
was decisively defeated in Europe and half the county occupied by the invader: the
empire.
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CHAPTER TWO: A NEW FRENCH ARMY?
The peace terms that France signed on 22 June1940 stipulated that the Armée
Métropolitaine (metropolitan army), those men usually recruited and stationed in
metropolitan France, would be limited to 100,000 men. 37 This was an effort on the part
of Germany to humiliate France since this number was the limit of the German army after
World War I. The majority of these men would eventually be disbanded when German
troops occupied the rest of France after the Allies invaded North Africa – even though the
Vichy government continued to exist after the Allied invasion. But what of the empire
and the soldiers still stationed in the colonies?
Robert O. Paxton, in Vichy France, states that the empire had a nightmarish
quality to Hitler. The very fact that France had colonies, and an ability to carry on the
war in North Africa if Germany’s terms were too onerous, meant that Hitler’s terms were
lenient towards his thoroughly defeated enemy; and Hitler told Mussolini on 17 June
1940 that, “the situation in which the French government might reject the German
proposals, then flee abroad to London to continue the war from there” would have to be
forestalled. 38 The empire was, however, more than just bargaining chip to Vichy.
Paxton states:
In a world in which Germany seemed to be rising and Britain declining, France
might be compensated overseas for what she was losing on the continent. Fertile
minds at Vichy, drawing bold geopolitical conclusions from the wave of
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Anglophobia that swept France after Mers-el-Kebir, even glimpsed opportunities
for expanding overseas at British expense. 39
Thus, France’s colonies gave Vichy a sense of hope and purpose considering its uncertain
future, but they also gave it the possibility for later expansion since it seemed to many
within the Vichy government that Germany had already won the war. 40 Therefore, Vichy
set about remaking France and the colonies, rejecting Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité
(Liberty, Equality, Fraternity), the ideals of the French Revolution, and replacing them
with Pétain’s Travail, Famille, Patrie to guarantee this control.
Paxton makes it clear that Pétain’s Vichy government was not just the Third
Republic in hiding, a “repair job” in Paxton’s words, but a completely new government
where Marshal Pétain would draft the new constitution. 41 In alternating sections of
chapter two, which Paxton entitled the National Revolution, he describes how:
The history of the National Revolution is, therefore, a history of the gradual
gathering around one set of poles: integral Catholicism, Napoleonic centralism,
more concentrated capitalism, and coercion. 42
Paxton’s major argument is that this National Revolution was not forced upon Vichy by
Germany, it was not “Hitler’s project,” but welcomed by many in France who wanted
stability from their government, even if that meant a curtailment of civil liberties.43 The
National Revolution quickly found its way to France’s colonies because they were
France’s future.
Eric Jennings, Vichy in the Tropics, and Martin Thomas, French Empire at War,
1940-1945, build upon Paxton’s work and illustrate not only the importance of the
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France’s empire in regards to France, but also the changing relationship between the
indigenous people of the colonies and the French, colonists as well as government
officials in France and the colonies. 44 Echoing Paxton, Thomas states, “Vichy ideology
and that regime’s acute instinct for self-preservation certainly made their impact upon
France’s colonial rulers … the war did lasting harm both to French imperial prestige and
the credibility of France’s distinctive philosophy of colonial assimilationism whereby
certain colonial subjects were expected to identify with French cultural values.” 45 The
National Revolution required Vichy to keep control of the colonies, “the empire was the
physical embodiment of what limited independence remained to the Vichy regime,” so
the colonial civilian and military governors had no difficulty relying more on decree than
before the war. 46 Jennings calls Vichy’s National Revolution introduction into the
colonies as, “a form of colonialism steeped in social-Darwinist determinism and rooted in
a reductionist, organic understanding of other, usually “primitive,” societies and
“races.”” 47 As Thomas suggests, Jennings also finds that Vichy’s harsher brand of
colonialism had lasting implications for France after the war, which is mostly outside the
scope of this thesis. However, Vichy in the Tropics does offer two important points for
this study.
First, Jennings clearly explains that the three colonies examined in his book,
Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, although far away from Germany’s direct
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influence, still experienced Vichy's National Revolution, which Jennings states as, “antidemocratic, ultraconservative, xenophobic,” and with a large group of state enemies such
as, “Jews, Freemasons, Communists, and democrats.” 48 In effect, the components of the
National Revolution could have been loosely enforced in these colonies because of their
distance from Vichy, but they were not, which strengthens Paxton’s argument that the
National Revolution was a Vichy construct. Vichy was, in effect, giving its colons
(colonial settlers), through the colonial administrators, the authority to ignore the “false
ideals” of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and just exploit and dominate the indigenous
peoples of the colony. 49 Another example of Vichy’s marginalization of local
governments states:
In 1940, substantial numbers of nonwhite Martinicans remained committed to
some form of republicanism, long associated on the island with movements
against slavery and for racial equality. When Pétain’s signing of the armistice
agreement with Germany in June 1940 prompted Charles de Gaulle to demand
continued resistance, the island’s mayors and conseillers généraux – most of
whom were mixed-race or black – responded within days, pledging to assume
“the ultimate sacrifices in order to achieve the final victory by continuing the
struggle alongside the Allies and the French Overseas Empire.” But by then,
Martinique had fallen under the authority of the senior white naval officer in the
Caribbean, Admiral Georges Robert … Overruling the locals, Robert aligned
Martinique with Vichy and set about installing an authoritarian regime that drew
strongly on the island’s small white Creole population, much of which
sympathized with Vichy. Although some mixed-race and black Martinicans
initially supported Robert’s effort, the regime quickly lost any type of broad
support as nonwhite islanders began to see that the new order favored whites. In
particular, Robert’s replacements of elected mayors, most of whom were of
mixed-race background, with appointees drawn from the white minority
undermined the popularity of his cause. 50
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Furthermore, this latest wave of native marginalization had started even earlier than 1940.
According to Jennings:
By the 1930s Antillean and other colonial voices of assimilationism were being
drowned out by a growing essentialist current that would culminate in Vichy’s
brand of colonialism. Building on the associationist theories of Louis Vignon, in
the 1930s a new generation of colonial experts like Jean Paillard plainly
encouraged “natives just to be natives.” 51
Vichy, in effect, cared little about it the aspirations of the indigenous peoples, especially
the burgeoning anti-colonial movements. But what Vichy could not ignore was the need
of indigenous military manpower for control of the colonies.
Thus, Jennings second point is that Vichy had to impose even more onerous
restrictions throughout the empire on the native soldiers who kept the colony under Vichy
control. When Vietnamese auxiliary troops deserted their French officers in 1940 or
local Guadeloupeans risked their lives to join the Free French (proportionately more than
in metropolitan France), Vichy officials had to do more to guarantee that Vichy’s
longevity. 52 Colonial officials used their unchecked power for such things as forced
labor in Madagascar and the abrogation of universal male suffrage in Guadeloupe. 53 The
colonies had to remain under Vichy control, for as Thomas suggests in French Empire,
“limited independence” was all that was left for the Vichy government in France.
Ironically, Paxton found that the real threat to Vichy during 1940 came not from a
completely dissatisfied France, a people unwilling to accept a defeated France, but the
men who commanded France’s overseas empire. Spared from seeing the blitzkrieg
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firsthand, men such as General Auguste Noguè in North Africa and General Eugène
Mittelhauser in the Near East raised objections before the June armistice took effect –
they wanted the battle to continue. The British attack on the French naval base at Mersel-Kebir on 3 July 1940, as well as the seizure of other French ships throughout the world
and other military actions by British armed forces, eventually help persuade both men to
accept the firm orders of General Maxime Weygand, their commander in chief, who later
toured much of French Africa in person during the fall of 1940 to keep the empire intact
for Vichy. 54 The importance of these commanders was that they not only followed the
orders of Vichy, but they brought the colonies they commanded with them into the Vichy
realm. The only overseas military commanders and governors to join de Gaulle were
Generals Paul Le Gentilhomme in Djibouti, Georges Catroux in Indochina, and governor
Félix Éboué of Chad. Both generals, however, did so as individuals. They did not bring
their men over to de Gaulle, for as Jennings states, “indigenous populations had no say
whatsoever in determining loyalty or resistance in 1940, as they were never consulted.” 55
Governor Éboué, who was black, gave de Gaulle complete control of Chad. At the end
of 1940, de Gaulle controlled a few parts of French Equatorial Africa and a few Pacific
islands. Control of the empire remained with Vichy, which was personified in Pétain.
Therefore, Vichy negotiated with the Germans to keep additional soldiers for the
colonies, i.e. troops in addition to the 100,000 men needed for the defense of France. The
original number of troops allowed in North Africa was 30,000 men, and smaller numbers
in the other colonies, but the number in North Africa was increased to 125,000 soldiers
after German authorities realized that all of Vichy’s colonies were threatened by
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Britain. 56 After the Western Allies invaded North Africa, these 125,000 men, who
previously had followed Vichy orders, were now fighting for the Allies since their
officers had changed their allegiance from Vichy to Free French, and when they were
agglomerated with the small number of soldiers who rallied to de Gaulle’s call in June
1940, which still numbered little more than around 35,000 men in late 1942, France was
then ready to wage war against Germany in Italy. 57 This answers part of the first
question of this thesis, how did France manage to send troops to Italy so soon after
November of 1942? The largest component of the FEC can trace its origins to the leaders
who stayed loyal to Vichy France; the soldiers these governors and military leaders led
had little, if any, ability to alter this relationship, for as Jennings stated earlier, they were
never asked. But as was asked in the introduction, were these 125,000 colonial soldiers
the same soldiers who fought in 1940? The answer, as many things are concerning the
study of history, was neither a yes or no.
Unlike World War I when it took some time before sizable numbers of troops
from the empire were available to help the Armée Métropolitaine defend France, by 1940
there were many soldiers from colonies stationed in France for its defense. Most of the
colonial formations were raised in Africa since the continent was seen as a huge reservoir
of French manpower. Those formations raised in French North Africa (Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia) were part of the Armée d’Afrique (African army); the men who
56
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were from any other French colony were part of La Coloniale (colonial), and most of the
Coloniale formations were raised in French West Africa. These two forces, Afrique and
Coloniale, amounted to over twenty percent of the infantry formations facing Germany in
1940 – over 250,000 men. 58 Although the individual units of these three different
formations had one goal in 1940, the defense of France, among the white officers – who
numbered nearly one hundred percent in all the units – leading the soldiers there was a
difference of opinion on how to accomplish it.
In Anthony Clayton’s study of French military system in Africa from its
foundation in the 1830s to the end of the empire around 1962, he found that
Métropolitaine officers tended to look down on Coloniale, and sometimes Afrique,
officers as professionally unskilled. 59 In return Coloniale and Afrique officers saw the
whole of the Armée Métropolitaine as formalist and hidebound, focusing on the bataille
conduite, while they saw themselves as men of action, schooled in colonial wars that
required the use in concepts of flexibility and resource. In effect, there was a prejudice
between the two sets of officers, Métropolitaine on the one side and Coloniale and
Afrique on the other. Furthermore, the French commanders of African formations,
including the generals, tended to direct their troops into action from the front. 60
Métropolitaine officers criticized this practice since they would be out of contact with
their own superiors, but this practice reflected colonial values where the commanders
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understood that they had to be seen as superior, as a man, to the men in order to lead
them. 61
Therefore, the FEC did share one trait with the 1940 French army: its soldiers
were a mixture of metropolitan soldiers and men from the empire. However, as opposed
to the 1940 army, in 1944 most of the soldiers who were visible to the enemy – often
called the ‘sharp end’ in military literature – were men who were not from metropolitan
France. And in regards to high-level leadership, there was a large difference. Without a
High Command to dictate bataille conduite tactics, the commander of the FEC, General
Juin, used the tactics that better suited his men: officers making decisions at the front,
without delay, to capitalize upon the enemy’s weaknesses since this was a colonial army
– officers must be seen by the men. In a recent book authored by John S. D. Eisenhower,
They Fought at Anzio, he states that the FEC, “were superb troops, especially for fighting
in the mountains … They were all Moroccans or Algerians, native troops with French
officers.” 62 Returning to the theme of forgotten histories mentioned in the introduction,
John Ellis or Graham/Bidwell would not argue with Eisenhower about the soldiers being
superb troops, but the very fact that the composition of the FEC is still not known sixty
years after the war ended – the FEC also included Tunisians and men from French West
Africa – is troubling since Eisenhower is a well-known American military author. Why
then were these men, unknown to many historians, who had such a complex and often
uneasy relationship to France, so effective when fighting for France in Italy? To begin to
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answer this question, it is first necessary to understand how France created its colonial
empire.
The use of indigenous manpower by the colonial leadership began shortly after
French started establishing colonies around the globe. William Cohen, in French
Encounter with Africans, argues that the Ancien Régime (old regime) had two schools of
thought for overseas expansion, population and mercantilist. 63 Colonies were an outlet
for France’s population growth, but also a market for French goods. However, even
though France was one of Europe’s most populous nations in the eighteenth century,
there were very few emigrants. 64 And since mercantilist requirements demanded
manpower, men to provide the goods to send to France or other colonies, as well as to
provide protection to the settlers/colonists and their growing economy, slaves were
eventually used for both purposes. The end of the Ancien Régime could have ended the
use of slavery in the empire, and it actually was abolished in 1794, but it was reinstated
by Napoleon in 1802 since it was the only way the colonial endeavors, including sugar
production, would remain lucrative. 65
Alice Conklin, in her studies of the French colonial system at the turn of the
twentieth century, found that the rhetoric of 1789, the rights of all people to basic
freedoms, was used as a justification by the French to rid Africa from the forms of
oppression that the French believed existed in Africa, “including African slavery,
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‘feudalism’, ignorance, and disease.” 66 The mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission) was
the justification used to uplift the “inferior races.” 67 The problem with the mission
civilisatrice, as Cohen and Conklin both make clear, was that in the end the mission
civilisatrice did not even attempt to uplift – the assumption that others needed uplifting
was itself very racist since it assumes that Western culture was somehow better than all
the native cultures. Initially, efforts were made in some of France’s colonies in an
attempt to assimilate the native populations with French culture. In Senegal the idea was
that:
Schooling was provided, in order, it was hoped, to create a young elite “with the
taste for our goods and industry,” who would be faithful to France and who would
spread European civilization. Furthermore, there were practical aspects to this
education: it would produce clerks for French commerce and administration. 68
However, the notion of assimilation eventually ended:
Only after the mid-nineteenth century, when French expansion started in earnest
and when the French had acquired a preponderance of power in their relationship
with Africans, did this racially relatively egalitarian society dissolve. The French,
becoming wary of the rising colored elite, restricted education and employment
opportunities and tried to take away political rights that previously had been
extended. With the advance of French imperialism, especially after the 1880s,
France dependence on the assimilated populations of Saint-Louis ceased, and a
new relationship between white and black, which was more rigid and racially
exclusive, was established in West Africa. 69
This “new relationship” was the concept of association.
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In Patricia M.E. Lorcin’s study, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and
Race in Colonial Algeria, she explains the concepts of assimilation and association very
succinctly:
Nineteenth-century French colonial theory encompassed two doctrines …
Assimilation and Association. In the former, the traditional colonial doctrine of
France, the theory was that the political, economic, and judicial institutions and
structures of the colony were to be assimilated into that of the mother country and
that the colonized peoples would eventually become Frenchmen … In practice
assimilation was never fully achieved. By the end of the nineteenth century total
assimilation was considered to be a pipe-dream and the doctrine, deemed
inadequate and unscientific, was replaced by that of association whereby the
colonizing power associated with the colonized, respecting their diverse
institutions and progressing in tandem rather than as one. 70
The problem with association was that it was no more based on science than was
assimilation, and the French military and civilian leadership did not always respect the
indigenous institutions.
Returning to Cohen and the notion of assimilation, he states that at the end of the
eighteenth century there were two trends of thought toward non-European peoples:
evolutionism and biological racism. 71 The evolutionary view posited that Africans would
evolve like Europeans, and that Africans were living in an era similar to that of the
European Middle Ages. Thus, Africans were not doomed to inferiority, but they were
also not the equals of Europeans. Their blackness would lessen as they evolved.
Regarding biology, although Africans were considered inferior, “they were still thought
to be capable of evolving physically and, hence, of rising in their social and intellectual
accomplishments as well.” 72 Thus, the concept of assimilation would have been logical
to the men trying to colonize Africa and other parts of the world if, returning to Lorcin’s
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definition, “an initial process of civilizing the indigenous populations,” eventually led to
all the native peoples of that colony embracing French culture and traditions.
However, the triumph of scientific racism – origins found in physiognomics,
physical anthropology, Darwinism, and some other pseudosciences – in the nineteenth
century meant that association eventually triumphed over assimilation. Cohen states that
the findings of nineteenth century biologists and geologists made it clear that the world
was much older than 6,000 years; and if blacks had descended from whites, it had taken
millions of years for them to become black, so it would take that long for them to return
to white: “One could no longer predict that within a generation or two blacks would turn
white and would also change socially and intellectually.” 73 Furthermore, as Cohen found
in the literature of the time:
The spread of European power around the globe was a sign of the superiority of
the white race: “everywhere it has shown itself to the be most intellectual and
industrious … The enslavement of blacks was a sign of their stupidity, for they
allowed themselves to “be duped, enchained and sold even by men less strong. 74
Lorcin explains that it was military officers in Algeria, especially medical officers, which
played an important role in the “science of race.” 75 As she states, “It was their
‘scientific’ approach, a necessary ingredient in creating the illusory ‘science of race’, that
lead to their scholarship being so well received in those academic circles exploring this
dubious new science.” 76 The problem with these officers and their scientific approach
was:
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Military personnel came to their research with certain presuppositions and
prejudices … [which] were modified to suit modern circumstances, and together
with progressive concepts were woven into the fabric of nineteenth-century racial
thought. Then too there was the military as an institution … paternalism and the
conditioning to hierarchical allegiances that military training produced,
encouraged patterns of thought well suited to racial dialogue. 77
In effect, at least regarding the French medical corps in Algeria, “Disease became a tool
with which to condemn indigenous society and medicine a symbol of racial and
technological superiority.” 78 Furthermore, French military officers found the indigenous
population of Algeria at the time of the French conquest was primarily Arab and Berber,
and due to the circumstances of the French conquest, Arabs occupying the coast (attacked
and conquered first) and Berbers living primarily in the mountains (taking longer to
pacify), they came to view that the Kabyles – the largest group of Berbers in Algeria –
“were superior to the Arabs … not that they were different, which they were.” 79 This
elevation of the Kabyles above the Arabs, the ‘Kabyle Myth’, was an assimilationist
notion since the Kabyles possessed traits – such as not fleeing when confronted with
combat (unlike the nomadic Arabs), sedentary nature, and tenacity – that could be likened
to the European peasant. 80 The problems confronting the Kabyles was that the French,
returning to Lorcin’s definition of association of “respecting their diverse institutions,”
never passed any pro-Kabyle colonial legislation, much less respecting their religious
convictions (“Muslims were required to repudiate their statutory right to Islamic law in
order to become French citizens”) or their property rights (almost 600,000 hectares of
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land were confiscated from the native population after the 1871 Kabylia insurrection). 81
Lorcin states that the land sequestration proved catastrophic to the Kabyle society since
the land taken, and given to French colonists, was the most fertile. In effect, “For all
their alleged superiority to the Arabs, when it came to land the Kabyles were indigénes in
the same light as the Arabs.” 82 In sum, during the nineteenth century assimilation was
eventually found to be flawed, but the benefits of association, extending into the
twentieth century, were little better. Ironically, it was the very traits that placed the
Kabyles above the Arabs (cultivated properties, well-built villages, and even factories
and production centers), which made them desirable as soldiers within the French
colonial system.
Once the French decided that the Kabyles could not be an independent entity
within a French territory, the end of their autonomy was soon to end. However, the
French were quick to realize that the Kabyles could be an important part of the French
military mission in Algeria: their days of fighting the French had ended but they were not
going to completely lay down their arms. French officers, General de Rumigny in this
instance, suggested that they would make perfect infantry to safeguard the frontiers of
Algeria as they were, “faithful, sober and industrious with responsible habits and
remarkable courage.” 83 The use of Berber soldiers for colonial defense extended later to
Tunisia (1881) and Morocco (1912) at their inclusion into the French colonial realm.
This does not, however, suggest that Arabs were not used as French colonial soldiers –
they were. France, however, needed more than colonial defense from its native soldiers.
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The idea of the use of black Africans in a European conflict had only originated in
1909 when a young French officer named Charles Mangin, who had served in Africa,
suggested that extensive recruitment of black Africans was possible. Mangin proposed
only using black volunteers, eliminating many of the problems that occurred with
conscription. 84 He believed that Africans possessed “warrior instincts that remained
extremely powerful in primitive races.” 85 Other traits included: the ability to live in
harsher climates than other races; the ability to carry large loads great distances; a less
developed nervous system (when compared to whites) so they could resist pain;
patriarchal hierarchy that endowed them with a sense of discipline; and a European belief
that Africa had been a battlefield for centuries so they were naturally suited to be
excellent soldiers. Mangin’s beliefs are a concrete example of the influence of scientific
racism in military writing; he based his arguments on the science of the day, drawing
from physical anthropology in this case. Mangin, a man of the times, then borrowed a
page from the British use of “martial race” theory in India and ranked the various black
African tribes according to their various martial qualities.86 Their perceived warlike
qualities guaranteed that Africans were going to be used as little more than fodder.
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By 1917, Mangin had obtained a position in the French High Command that
guaranteed that black African units were concentrated in order to maximize their “shock”
power, a policy he favored. 87 This policy governing their use was codified in Notice sur
les Sénégalais et leur emploi au combat (Directions on the Senegalese and their
employment in combat), issued in the last year of the war. 88 This does not suggest,
however, that black Africans were not used in mass before 1918. General Pierre
Berdoulat, commanding the 1st Corps of the Colonial Army during the Somme battles in
1916, found that their “limited intellectual faculties” diminished their effectiveness in
combat, but they were primarily useful “for sparing a certain number of European lives at
the moment of assaults.” 89 General Robert Nivelle, the commander of the French army
in early 1917, insisted on the maximum deployment of black troops prior to his Aisne
offensive since:
It is imperative that the number of [African] units put at my disposition should be
increased as much as possible. [This will] increase the power of our projected
strength and permit the sparing – to the extent possible – of French blood. 90
Their use as shock troops explains their high combat losses. Nearly seven million white
Frenchmen served in combat roles during World War I, and of this total almost 1,256,000
died – a loss ratio of eighteen percent. Algeria had almost 159,000 men in combat
positions, of which 36,000 died. That number represents twenty-three percent. The
numbers for Tunisia are 54,000, 10,000, and nineteen percent respectively.
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Approximately 140,000 West Africans served, of whom 31,000 were killed – over
twenty-two percent. Morocco had 37,000 serve, but no records were kept regarding those
killed in action. 91 Considering that France had incurred nearly 400,000 killed by
November 1914, before African soldiers started reaching France in meaningful numbers
(North Africans started entering the conflict in large numbers by October 1914 and black
Africans by early 1916), the contribution – and loss – of the Africans in the trenches is
staggering. 92 But why did these African soldiers take higher casualties than those of
metropolitan Frenchmen? Georges Clemenceau, who became Prime Minister of France
on 16 November 1917, explains part of the African wastage of manpower when he told a
group of senators in February 1918 that:
Although I have infinite respect for these brave blacks, I would much prefer to
have ten blacks killed than a single Frenchman, because I think that enough
Frenchmen have been killed and that it is necessary to sacrifice them as little as
possible. 93
It is clear that Clemenceau, a committed imperialist and republican, was influenced by
the scientific racism of the era, and that the government and its military leaders were of
the same mind regarding the use of Africans in Europe.
While large numbers of African units were not ready to engage in battle at the
beginning of World War I, if only because all the nations involved thought that the war
would be over quickly, by 1939 the French High Command was relying on African
soldiers to replace white Frenchmen, replacing the men who were voting citizens with
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those who most often had no political voice. Furthermore, the High Command realized
that its empire had allowed France to continue the fight in World War I with additional
soldiers, workers, and goods. As mentioned earlier, Africa added nearly twenty divisions
to the French order of battle in 1940. As one French officer commented on France’s
colonial soldiers in 1940:
Thrown into battle like the division of 1918, without means of transport, obliged
to make long forced marches, these North African divisions were sacrificed to no
gain whatever. They were, however, composed of excellent troops, almost all
were fully armed and equipped. Better deployed, concentrating on the major
defensive position, they would have been able to withstand longer the assaults of
an enemy they could not destroy. 94
To this officer, colonial soldiers were “excellent troops” in 1940; Eisenhower stated that
they were “superb troops” in 1944. In chapter one, this thesis suggested that part of the
FEC’s effectiveness in Italy might be because the French troops in 1940 were not so
completely outclassed by their Germany adversaries, i.e. that the units of the FEC did not
begin from scratch in learning how to defeat German troops. Another possible answer,
building upon Lunn, is that the same willingness to expend African lives that existed in
French military circles during World War I also existed in World War II, and that the
perceived effectiveness of the FEC in Italy was its leadership being willing to guarantee
success at the expense of its soldiers. Returning to Ellis, how were “their attacks
consistently pressed home with the greatest panache” if the soldiers had believed that
they were little more and cannon fodder? What were some factors that might have
motivated the troops to fight for a county that often denied them rights that were given to
the white settlers of the colonies?
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Gregory Mann, in his Native Sons, answers this motivational question by
examining one region of Mali. He states that Mangin wanted African men to enlist,
before and during World War I, rather than be conscripted because of the types of
benefits, both symbolic and material, they would receive when they left the military.
These benefits included: future access to a colonial job, a military pension, or some level
of authority in their village upon their return. 95 In some instances, Mangin did get black
Africans to enlist – often with the help of black leaders. For example, Blaise Diagne,
who was the first black African elected to the French National Assembly, was able to get
some of his constituents to enlist for the duration of the war by gaining firm recognition
from the Third Republic that Senegalese born in the four communes were entitled to
French citizenship. 96 However, in other villages and towns – without the offer of
citizenship – the potential gain of serving was not enough. Some towns had their
population shrink in both World Wars as men fled the demands of the colonial state:
young men resisted it by fleeing, feigning illness, or passing the burden along to
less powerful neighbors, particularly strangers, migrants, and people of slave
descent … The commandant attributed the success of the drive – even in areas
that had risen in revolt in 1916 – largely to the fact that chiefs, rather than
administrators, would designate the men to be conscripted. 97
In other instances, rather than just fleeing long enough to avoid colonial officials, the men
would leave the region controlled by France for a land governed by another European
power. 98 Without enough Africans volunteering, France had to rely upon the 1912
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Conscription Law. Mann sums up the reasoning behind French conscription very
succinctly:
Writers in the Third Republic claimed that France did not owe the colonies, but
that the people of the colonies were indebted to France for having saved them
from slavery and brought them civilization. In the years immediately before the
First World War, the idea of debt was used to justify African conscription …
“Africa cost us piles of gold, thousands of soldiers, and rivers of blood. We
would never dream of reclaiming the gold, but the men and the blood she should
repay to us with interest.” 99
Thus, for France the conscription of soldiers was the only means “that African colonies
could reimburse France for the humanist enterprise of colonialism.” 100 As for the
Africans, Mann states that the military veteran had a “moral claim to assistance,” which
was as old as the Revolution – “veterans’ recompense [was] declared a ‘sacred debt’ by
the republic of 1792 and every subsequent regime” – but for the twentieth century, as
stated earlier, could be a job, his pension, and often a place of authority within his village
or town since he might be one of the few people allowed to vote. 101 Furthermore, after
the soldiers either volunteered or were conscripted, the European officers entered into
another form of debt to his African solders – Mann calls it “reminders of the
dependence.” 102 The officers were obligated to perform specific duties or military
effectiveness suffered since “no one knew better than the soldiers what their officers
owed them.” 103 French officers prided themselves on becoming “Africains,” or “old
Africa hands” by learning the soldier’s language and culture. If the officer did his part,
“making sure the soldiers were fell fed, well lead, and properly housed,” the soldiers
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would follow his orders. 104 If the soldiers did not know their officer, or did not believe
that their officer was sharing their risks, the result might be military failure. 105
Another factor that might explain African motivation was the sheer brutality of
the French military in the colonies. Clayton explains:
the colonial self-assurance on occasion led to a feature of behaviour drearily
familiar to all historians but perhaps especially so to historians of colonial rule;
the gaps of self-delusion between proclaimed and often lofty ideals and reality …
Generals … with the loftiest ideals and genuine respect for indigenous culture,
would fight pacification campaigns of the greatest severity, not flinching from the
wholesale destruction of the resisters’ peasant economies and the calculated use
of terror, all in the belief that such methods were entirely justifiable. 106
As late as the 1920s, during the Rif War of 1920-26, the French were still trying to secure
their empire and used whatever methods were needed, including the burning of whole
villages, to secure the land in Morocco that they deemed part of the French empire from
Abd el-krim, the leader of the Rif tribes. This use of extreme violence was, as Clayton
suggests, the norm for much of France’s success in pacifying Africa.
One final motivating element for African soldiers, at least in World War II, is
explained in Nancy E. Lawler’s study, Soldiers of Misfortune: Ivoirien Tirailleurs of
World War II. 107 Lawler states that there were over 100,000 black Tirailleurs (riflemen)
in France by May 1940 awaiting the German attack, which is one of the reasons for the
public optimism before the German attack since black Tirailleurs, based on the colonial
rhetoric, were considered invincible warriors. She explains that some of their battlefield
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tenacity (they often fanatically resisted German attacks), was because they were told that
the Germans would be extremely brutal to them if they were taken prisoner. General
Walter Nehring, General Heinz Guderian’s Chief of Staff in 1940 (who was the corps
commander of the German troops at Sedan), states in one paragraph concerning African
colonial soldiers that, “French colonial soldiers have mutilated in bestial fashion our
German wounded … all kindness would be an error … They are to be treated with the
greatest rigour.” 108 It did not seem to matter that there was little, if any, proof of African
soldiers mutilating German wounded or dead. Furthermore, German soldiers, in an effort
to prove that they were better fighters than any soldier Africa could produce (the benefits
of their Aryan heritage), went to great lengths to overcome Tirailleur resistance, rather
than bypass the Tirailleur positions, which is one of the tenets of the blitzkrieg – avoiding
combat to disrupt the enemy’s rear areas. It became a self-fulfilling prophecy since the
black Africans had to resist, because of their fear of being captured, and the German
soldiers, on account of their Aryan superiority, had to defeat them on the battlefield. As
one German put it:
The French fought tenaciously; the blacks especially used every resource to the
bitter end, defending every house. To break them we had to use flame throwers,
and to overcome the last Senegalese, we had to kill them one by one.” 109
Similar to their experiences in World War I, black Tirailleurs took large losses before the
armistice was signed in July 1940 – ten percent were killed during the two-month
campaign. 110 Therefore, the potential French brutality in the colonies might have gotten
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the soldiers to France, but the threat of German brutality only strengthened the motivation
to fight. The losses taken by African soldiers, while often exceeding that of the
Métropolitaine, is however, only part of the story.
Returning to Doughty’s study, Breaking Point, he nicely illustrates one of the key
differences between the placement of leaders among the various formations –
Métropolitaine, Coloniale and Afrique – of the Third Republic. At the battle of La
Horgne, it was the 3rd Spahis Brigade, composed of Moroccan and Algerian troops, led
by French officers, that fought German panzer troops to a draw for much of the day.
At 0430 hours … elements of the 3rd Brigade arrived at La Horgne. Of all the
battles fought during the 1940 campaign, none subsequently was as revered or
commemorated by the French as the valiant struggle by the two Moroccan and
Algerian regiments at La Horgne. Using barricades and trenches … the
cavalrymen fiercely resisted the German attacks … Though the 3rd Brigade did
not fulfill its mission of holding La Horgne for twenty-four hours, it significantly
delayed the advance of the 1st Panzer Division. But this was not accomplished
without significant losses. More than half of the Algerians and Moroccans who
fought at La Horgne died there. And among the dead were twelve of the thirtyseven French officers who fought there, including the commander of one of the
regiments and his successor. 111
While an examination of this one battle cannot possibly be interpolated to represent all
the battles fought by imperial soldiers in 1940, it does appear to highlight the differences
between the methodical battle doctrine, which required officers to remain in the rear, and
the traits that Afrique and Coloniale leaders saw in themselves, that they were men of
action. 112 As mentioned earlier, Clayton states that officers leading African soldiers had
to been seen to be effective, “the commander had to be seen to be superior, as a man, to
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his men.” 113 The differences in style, examined by counting the number of officers
killed, finds the 3rd Spahis Brigade losing over thirty-two percent of the officers during in
one day. The 55th Division, following the safer doctrine, lost none of its key leaders
during the 13th of May, the day that German panzer troops crossed the Meuse River at
Sedan in strength. When comparing the German losses among its officers to these two
French units, the finding should not be surprising when the German casualties were
similar to those of the 3rd Spahis, rather than the 55th. Out of the 55,000 men in the XIXth
Panzer Korps, who fought from Luxembourg to Dunkirk, 3,845 (almost seven percent)
became casualties during the two weeks it took them to reach the coast – 640 killed
(slightly over one percent) and 3,205 wounded (almost six percent). Officers numbered
about 1,500 men in the XIXth, almost three percent of the manpower within the corps, but
their total losses were fifty-three killed (close to four percent) and 241 wounded (a little
more than sixteen percent). 114 German officers, who were also trained to lead their men
at the front, paid a steep price for their success, but in the long run their willingness for
sacrifice kept the 1940 campaign short.
In 1940 the French High Command had a French army in Europe, but an army
composed of three different elements: Armée Métropolitaine, Armée d’Afrique and La
Coloniale. Their primary responsibilities were to protect metropolitan France. 115 Their
adherence to the methodical battle would suggest that they did, in fact, have only one
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doctrine. 116 However, the notion that the officers from these different elements
(Métropolitaine, Afrique and Coloniale) viewed the other differently, Métropolitaine
were formalist and hidebound, while the Afrique and Coloniale were careerist and
professionally unskilled, does hint that there might be two styles of leadership in place at
the tactical level in 1940. This may, in part, explain the success of the FEC in Italy since
the Métropolitaine officers were no longer directing the campaign. In Italy an officer
with origins from the Armée d’Afrique, imbued with a colonial mindset and most likely
familiar with General Mangin’s military beliefs regarding colonial troops, was in charge.
General Alphonse Juin was born in Algeria in 1888. A classmate of de Gaulle at
the French military academy at St. Cyr, he was wounded fighting in France in 1915
where he lost the use of this right arm. During 1940 he commanded a métropolitaine
division in France and eventually surrendered with his men to the Germans. By June of
1941 the Vichy government persuaded the Germans to release him so he could command
all the French troops in Morocco; in November of that same year he became the
commander of all the land forces in North Africa. After the Allies invaded North African
in November of 1942, he joined the Allied effort and led the French forces against
German and Italian troops in Tunisia in 1942 and 1943. He eventually joined the Free
French movement in mid-1943, but the fact that he had served Vichy made his job in
Italy more difficult. Juin had to prove that he was genuinely loyal to France – not Vichy
– since one of his divisions was a Free French division, led by men who had followed de
Gaulle since 1940. Eisenhower states:
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Juin, was a remarkable man, though easy to underestimate. He was small in
stature, and the fact was unfortunately emphasized when he was photographed
beside the towering Clark … The British seem prone to sniff at Juin’s military
knowledge and his sharp brain, overlooking the fact that he graduated first in his
class at the French Military Academy, St. Cyr. Born and raised in North Africa,
he understood his troops thoroughly. 117
Ellis, Graham, and Bidwell would not argue with Eisenhower’s assessment of Juin, but
for purposes of this study it must be understood that Juin most likely understood how to
motivate his African troops, rather than actually understanding them. Juin was, in fact, a
product of the colonial mentality that would not pause for a moment to use force against
the native peoples of Africa, a tradition that praised the strengths of colonial troops while
simultaneously needing to maintain a strict racial hierarchy. But who were these troops
that he would command, soldiers who had been spilling blood for France since the
French conquest of their land?
The military formations in the colonies would be a mixture of white Frenchmen,
from either France or settlers in the colonies, who were the officers as well as the
noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and a large number of indigenous soldiers, volunteer
or conscripts, who were the riflemen – the Armée d’Afrique and La Coloniale. 118 The
term “volunteer,” as Mann argues in Native Sons, has special meaning for many of
France’s indigenous soldiers since very few actually ever volunteered. To fulfill the
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colonial government’s requirement, local chiefs consistently sent the sons of wolosow
(children of female slaves) off to be soldiers, even after conscription was introduced.
Although the men of the Armée d’Afrique and La Coloniale have been so far lumped
together, for simplicity when comparing them to the Armée Métropolitaine, they were, in
fact, two military formations of very different men.
The Armée d’Afrique was composed of men who were organized into seven
different combat formations. 119 The combat formations were then broken down into
European units and those units largely made up of indigènes (indigenous) soldiers. The
European formations were the Zouave (infantry), Infanterie Légère d’Afrique (light
infantry), Chasseurs d’Afrique (cavalry), and the Légion Etrangère (Foreign Legion).
These formations, although they were white units, were always stationed outside of
France, and unlike the Armée Métropolitaine formations, were often used outside of
North Africa when France had to use force elsewhere in the world, such as the Crimea
and Mexico in the nineteenth century.
The first Zouaves were formed around 1830 as a strictly volunteer formation of
riflemen, both European and indigenous soldiers, when France began the conquest of
Algeria. Since French colonists needed protection from the native peoples, returning to
Clayton’s study where he explains how French efforts to pacify the indigenous people
often took an extreme form so many native peoples would not hesitate at retribution, in
all three North African colonies (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) the Zouaves eventually
became a white formation. The battles that the Zouaves fought during the nineteenth
century, and their military success (as well as their colorful uniforms), ensured that
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metropolitan Frenchmen were always willing to volunteer for this unit, but the number of
volunteers was never high enough to fill every position within the various battalions so
settlers from the colonies were eventually conscripted to fill the ranks. Zouaves fought in
France in 1940, and in the campaign to liberate France during 1944, but they did not see
employment as a unit in the FEC. Many of the colonists were used as officers and NCOs
in the FEC and other units that needed Frenchmen since they at least had some
knowledge of the North African people, language, and customs. 120
The Infanterie Légère d’Afrique was originally formed as a penal unit in 1832, a
direct response to the French Revolution of 1830, since the need for European manpower
was in such high demand for Africa. It eventually became, like the Zouaves, a mostly allvolunteer formation of metropolitan Frenchmen and European colonials. Like the
Zouaves, men from this unit did not serve in the FEC as a unit but as a provider of
Europeans soldiers within the North African divisions. 121
The Chasseurs d’Afrique fit the need for a light cavalry unit in Africa to
reconnoiter and pursue enemies on horseback. Initially composed of soldiers from
France, mostly volunteers but a few conscripts, it eventually became, like the Zouaves
and Infanterie Légère, a mixed unit of volunteers and conscripts from France and North
African settlers, but also some North African Jews, non-French Europeans, and a few
indigenous men. Trading in their horses for trucks, tanks, and armored cars, the
Chasseurs provided reconnaissance units for the North African divisions in the 1940
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campaign, and by 1943-44 the formations were performing tank-destroyer (TD) duties for
the FEC. 122
The Légion Etrangère (Foreign Legion) is one of best-known military formations
of the Armée d’Afrique. Formed in 1831, it formed a unit for many of the foreign
mercenary soldiers who had previously served with the French army and were no longer
needed – or wanted – in France. This was an all-volunteer formation, which reflected
European upheavals, unemployment, and deteriorating social conditions throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The indigenous formations included: Tirailleurs (riflemen or sharpshooters),
Spahis (cavalry), and Goums (irregular infantry). These units were generally a mixture of
white officers and NCOs, and African volunteers and/or conscripts who occupied the
lowest military positions, along with some native soldiers who were also NCOs. The one
colony that seemed primarily to provide volunteers was Morocco, “since Morocco’s
protectorate status did not permit any formalized quota/conscription system (although the
issue was debated in France in 1920).” 123 However, it is difficult to believe that all the
soldiers were volunteers since the Moroccan government could have been pressured by
the French to produce volunteers.
The initial Tirailleurs units were raised in the 1840s in Algeria, followed by
Tunisia in the 1880s and Morocco after 1912. 124 These units often comprised over half
of a colony’s military power. By 1939 a regiment of Tirailleurs contained approximately
122
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2,500 men in which twenty percent were French; most of the officers were French and
many of the NCOs were Arabic-speaking North African colons (colonists or settlers).
Unlike Armée Métropolitaine soldiers, Tirailleur soldiers did not receive training at
formalized centers, with programs or manuals to follow. The men were taken out into
remote locations and trained by the French officers and NCOs. The strong paternalism of
the French cadre, reflected by the use of tu, rather than vous (helping to maintain the
strict racial hierarchies of the time), by French officers and NCOs when speaking to
indigenous NCOs and soldiers, as well as the longer military service of the volunteers
and conscripts helped create some very effective African combat units. 125 Mann defines
this particular kind of military paternalism:
In the decades before the war, during the conquest and the consolidation of
colonial rule, French officers had developed a protean version, which some used
constantly and other used haltingly in recounting their relationships with African
soldiers. While they frequently portrayed the men they commanded as childlike
and simple, references to the loyalty of the African soldiers were all but
obligatory in the self-congratulating memoirs of colonial officers …. This
supposed loyalty was the source of much pride, and officer often saw it as
evidence of the salutary effects of colonial military culture, if not of their own
good character. 126
And when the relationship between white Frenchman and African worked, it often
worked very well, such as at the battle of La Horgne mentioned earlier in this chapter.
However, when it didn’t work, the result was disastrous for the African formation. For
example, some North African soldiers during the Battle of Verdun in World War I were
even shot by their own machine guns since:
A section of the Tirailleurs had lost its nerve; then a platoon, a company, and
finally a whole battalion wavered and broke … the 3rd Zouaves had, it seems,
dissolved … a captain, thrust into a position of command and frustrated at the
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retreat, ordered guns to fire on his own troops: “a section of machine guns fired at
the backs of the fleeing men, who fell like flies.” 127
A post-war investigation determined that these soldiers had recently received new
officers, destroying the bond of camaraderie that is needed to forge successful combat
units at the lowest levels, and had been successfully shelled by artillery, as well as
suffering in the bitter cold in exposed positions. They finally broke at the sight of
advancing Germans. 128 It is difficult to believe that the captain would have ordered his
weapons to fire at his “own troops” of white Frenchmen – actual French citizens. The
fact that these soldiers, who were often deemed very capable soldiers, started panicking
after being fed into the line with little thought given to unit cohesion, and nothing in the
way of prepared positions, seemed not to have been an issue.
The Spahis were first formed in the early 1830s in Algeria. The Régiment de
Spahis Tunisiens was created in 1911-12, and the Régiment de Spahis Marocains was
formed in 1914. Like the Tirailleurs, Algerian and Tunisian formations were a mixture
of volunteer and conscripts, while all the Moroccan units were supposedly all volunteers.
But unlike the European Chasseurs that were motorized by the 1940 campaign, the
Spahis were still cavalry units. In terms of manpower, a two-regiment brigade contained
eighty French officers and 2,200 other ranks, of which 930 were French (or
approximately forty-five percent was French). By 1943-44 the Spahis had also traded in
their horses, but unlike the Chasseurs, which was armed with open-topped tank
destroyers and light tanks, the Spahis were organized for motorized reconnaissance roles.
Reconnaissance required that all the troops rode in light tanks, armored cars, halftracks,
127

Laura Rice, “African Conscripts/European Conflicts: Race, Memory, and the Lessons of War.” Cultural

Critique, no. 45 (Spring 2000): 136-137.
128

Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts, 36.

51

trucks, and jeeps, which were all manufactured in the United States. 129 Since these new
formations, found in all the FEC divisions, required a large number of specialized duties,
the number of indigenous soldiers fell dramatically. For example, each cavalry
formation, Chasseurs or Spahis, contained thirty-three French and one indigenous officer
and approximately 120 French and four indigenous senior NCOs in the 1943-44
regiments (that had the manpower of a standard United States, French, or German
battalion). The real difference was found in the number of junior NCOs and soldiers,
with the Spahis having 813 European and 127 indigenous versus 583 European and 143
indigenous in the Chasseurs. 130 It would have been logical to think that the Spahis would
have more indigenous soldiers, since it was an African unit, but since this unit was highly
motorized, there were more Europeans.
The last major indigenous combat formation from the Armée d’Afrique used in the
Italian battles was comprised of Berbers from Morocco. Initially formed in 1908, this allvolunteer formation – since it was from Morocco – was called a Goums, and when sent to
Italy they were the equivalent of one infantry division. 131 They were originally created to
provide French formations operating in Morocco with patrolling and reconnaissance
assistance, maintaining order in regions that had been pacified, gathering intelligence,
and providing a “stiffening” to other irregular units. They were so effective in
performing security duties that the French army eventually succeeded in having them
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form auxiliary units that could be used outside of Morocco. Their use of mules, which
formed a support section in each Goum, allowed these men to succeed in Italy where the
truck-bound United States army could not. The German military, when they sent
inspectors to Vichy North Africa and when facing Goums in Italy, placed little value in
these forces. A Goum, the equivalent of a standard company, had approximately 120
infantry, fifty cavalrymen, the above mentioned mule section, and a small heavy weapon
section (machine-guns and mortars). By 1943-44 a Tabor, which was the equivalent of a
battalion, contained a group of three Goums and one heavy weapon Goum. Total
manpower in a Tabor was slightly over 1,500, and the majority was comprised of
indigenous soldiers. Three Groupements de Tabors Marocains, the equivalent of a
standard regiment, eventually saw combat in Italy. 132 In effect, these three Groupements
gave Juin the equivalent of another infantry division.
The major combat units of La Coloniale were the Colonial Blanche (white
Europeans) and the Tirailleurs Sénégalais (a generic term given to all units recruited
from France’s West African colonies). 133 The Colonial Blanche did not provide any
large combat formations in Italy, except to provide officers and NCOs for the Tirailleurs
Sénégalais.
The Tirailleurs Sénégalais was created in 1857. Although at its creation it was
hoped that this would be an all-volunteer force, as Mann illustrated, many of the original
soldiers were previous slaves or were provided to the French by village chiefs who often
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had their own agenda – and most likely some were under pressure by the local French
government official. 134 Conscription, since there were not enough volunteers to generate
all the units that France needed, was instituted right before World War I and was
continued until the end of World War II.
Morocco, as stated earlier, did not allow for a formalized conscription system of
its indigenous people. Frenchmen, as well as those white settlers in Africa, were required
to accept conscription since that was what was necessary to defend metropolitan France
and the colonies from French enemies. 135 The remainder of North Africa and those lands
defended by La Coloniale did allow France to use indigenous conscripts according to the
1912 Conscription Law, which meant that all indigenous 18-year-olds were liable for
three (or more) years of military service. The requirement for three years became even
more important as a means to secure additional soldiers to man France’s military
formations when there was a reduction of Armée Métropolitaine conscription that started
in 1905. Actual requirements by the French military from Africa, however, meant that
only a small percentage of Africans were ever selected. Algeria, for example, only had
five percent of its eligible men selected. 136 In many of the regions where Sénégalais
soldiers were selected, only one or two percent of its eligible men were ever needed (at
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least before either of the World Wars). 137 Ideally, conscripts were only to be used after
there were no additional volunteers available.
These were the soldiers, European and African, which France was sending against
Germany’s panzer, panzer grenadier, parachute and infantry divisions in Italy. There
were a total of four French infantry divisions, and the equivalent of another division with
the inclusion of the Goums. And aside from the Goums, the four infantry divisions had a
standard organization (with some minor variations by Free French division that had been
created by the British), which was very similar to a American infantry division since the
United States was providing much of the equipment the French were using.
By the beginning of World War II, most countries had a very similar combat
formation for infantry formations. Most often when countries are comparing military
strengths, the units counted are divisions. A typical infantry division is displayed in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1 Typical Divisional Organization In World War II
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At the lowest level was the rifle squad, which could contain from eight to twenty soldiers
(depending upon the nation), but in the French/American organization it contained twelve
men. The next level was the rifle platoon, which usually contained three rifle squads and
a small headquarters unit, and contained approximately forty-two soldiers in the
French/American organization (some minor variations were found here).The rifle
company was comprised of three rifle platoons and a heavy-weapon platoon that
contained a few mortars (normally fifty to sixty millimeters in diameter) and machineguns, along with a headquarters unit. Total manpower would be nearly 200 soldiers. The
next formation was the rifle battalion that had three rifle companies, one heavy-weapon
company (similar to the previous heavy-weapon platoon but with more of the “heavy”
weapons), and a headquarters formation. Total manpower was slightly more than 900
men; and for this paper, the focus will be on the battalion and the units below it, down to
the squad level where most of the colonial soldiers were located. Three rifle battalions
comprised a regiment, for the United States, France, and Germany, but a brigade for the
British. The use of the term regiment or brigade, however, does not mean that they are
interchangeable; they are not equal in firepower or capability.
For example, the British used the brigade formation as a holding unit for three
rifle battalions; Germany and France used regiments as combat formations. A British
rifle brigade added a small anti-tank unit in the 1940 campaign to the firepower of its
three battalions, not counting a forty-man defense platoon. A German rifle regiment
supported its three battalions with a howitzer company (six seventy-five millimeter and
two 150 millimeter infantry guns), an AT company (twelve anti-tank guns), as well as a
hefty pioneer (engineer) platoon. The French, who placed great value upon the need to
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know where the enemy was and what they were capable of doing, decided to have a
reconnaissance battalion, Chasseurs and Spahis, support each division in Italy instead of
a reconnaissance troop (equal to a company) found in an American infantry division. 138
Therefore, divisions could range in size from six to eight thousand men for a standard for
Soviet rifle division, which followed the same basic structure as outlined above but with
fewer men at each level (and therefore less capabilities), to the 15,000 men in a United
States division or 16,000 (plus) men in the French rifle divisions – up to 18,000 men in a
British division. 139 A division is a division, but they were not all equal, and as much as
leadership had a role in their ability, what doctrine were they using, the ability and
number of men found at the lowest levels, squad and platoon levels, often determined the
outcomes of battles.
The most unusual and diverse of the French divisions, aside from the Goums, was
the 1re Division de Marche d’Infanterie (D.M.I. or 1st Infantry Division), which was
previously the 1re Division Française Libre (D.F.L. or 1st Free French Division). 140 It
had its origins as a Coloniale unit, in which units were often mixte (intedgrated), a
138
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combination of blanche (white) and Sénégalais battalions. Since it had fought with the
British 8th Army, it used – and retained until the end of the war – the brigade designation
instead of the regiment. The 1st Brigade was a composite unit: the 13e Légion Etrangère
demi-brigade, a confusing term for two battalions of Légions and a battalion of infantry
recruited in Algeria. The 2nd Brigade contained three battalions of Tirailleurs Sénégalais,
who had been recruited in French West Africa. The 4th Brigade had two Coloniale
battalions that had been recruited in Djibouti, then French Somaliland, and one battalion
of infantry made up of a French marine unit from the Pacific. Its reconnaisance unit,
which was a battalion instead of the standard American troop (or company), was also a
marine unit. 141 This unit was the last to arrive in Italy, April 1944, although it had been
ready in Africa since February. Its delayed enterance can be attributed to the fact that
General Juin, as mentioned earlier, had served under the Vichy government and the
officers of the 1st Division did not want to be included as part of Juin’s FEC. 142
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The 4e Division de Montagne Marocaine (D.M.M. or 4th Moroccan Mountain
Division) had three regiments (1st, 2nd, 6th) of Moroccan Tirailleurs. The reconnaissance
battalion was also from Morocco, Spahis in this instance. The division eventually
reached Italy in February 1944. 143
The 2e Division d’Infanterie Marocaine (D.I.M. or 2nd Moroccan Infantry
Division), like the 4th Moroccan, also contained three regiments (4th, 5th, 8th) of Moroccan
Tirailleurs. Its reconnaissance unit was a Moroccan Spahis regiment, which in this
instance was the equivalent of a battalion. The division arrived in Italy during November
1943. 144
The final division in the FEC was the 3e Division d’Infanterie Algérienne (D.I.A.
or 3rd Algerian Infantry Division). It was composed of two regiments of Algerian
Tirailleurs and one regiment of Tunisian Tirailleurs. The reconnaissance unit was
regiment of Algerian Spahis, also the size of a battalion. It also arrived in November
1943. 145
The last major combat unit was the three Groupe de Tabors Morocains – 1st, 3rd,
and 4th. Each Groupe was the equivalent of a French/American regiment. While not as
powerful as the standard Tirailleur regiment, since they did not have a regimental cannon
company (six 105 millimeter cannons), they were very capable light infantry who often

American ones, they would have ready much sooner. Ironically, those units that had fought with the
French XIX Corps in Tunisia became the first divisions to fight the Germans in Italy.
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preferred to use the knife rather than the rifle. The 3e and 4e Groupement arrived during
December 1943 and the 1er Groupe in February 1944. 146
General Juin was cocksure about the abilities of his men, especially considering
the terrain in which they would be fighting. His corps was an infantry heavy formation,
but his soldiers could call upon great amounts of firepower since the divisions had the
standard American artillery component of thirty-six 105 millimeter and twelve 150
millimeter artillery howitzers. However, that firepower could not always be used in the
hills and mountains of Italy. It was up to the men, and their will to get at the enemy that
would eventually redeem the French military in World War II. As one historian found,
“the Algerian Division’s gaining of Monte Belvedere and Monte Abate is an example of
a battle won by sheer strength of will as much as by weapons and tactical skill.” 147 That
“sheer strength of will” could not, however, alleviate the large blood debt that France
demanded from its colonies.
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CHAPTER THREE: ITALY AND THE
FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY CORPS
From the moment that the Allies landed in Italy, they faced a determined and
capable enemy. Furthermore, they were confronted by difficult terrain (mountains
divided by chasms and gorges), problems with transportation (bad and damaged roads, or
none at all), and terrible weather (rain, snow, sudden floods, and fog). Italy “was an
infantryman’s battle, in which the quality of leadership among junior officers and NCOs
was decisive, and it was this, perhaps more than any other factor, that secured the
eventual French success.” 148 The question then becomes: was it French leadership (and
the institution of a new doctrine?), the composition of the soldiers, or a combination of all
these factors that made French soldiers so successful in Italy?
Major Claude R. Hinson, who served in an American tank battalion supporting
the 3rd D.I.A., found that, in this instance, the white, “non-commissioned officers, as well
as the commissioned, were determined, aggressive and most courageous.” 149 These were
the qualities that brought the French battlefield success in Italy, as they had the 3rd Spahis
Brigade at La Horgne. It was up to the officers of the FEC to ensure that the men were
motivated, to make them believe that they could still win the battle with their fellow
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soldiers falling around them. 150 An examination of officer casualties in Italy does seem
to suggest that divisions were following a different doctrine than the 1940 methodical
battle, that French losses in Italy were going to be more similar to the 3rd Spahis Brigade
losses rather than the losses of the 55th Division at Sedan.
The 2nd D.I.M., in twenty-one days of combat during the last days of 1943,
incurred 923 casualties: 211 dead (nineteen officers); 656 wounded (forty-two officers);
fifty-six missing (one officer) – summarized in Table 1. Officers were nearly seven
percent of the casualties, but this number is only half the equation. 151 At the end of
Table 1 French Divisional Causalities During Specific Battles In Italy, 1943-44
Division:
Dead:
Wounded:
Missing:
Total Casualties:
2nd D.I.M (’43)
211 (19)
656 (42)
56 (1)
923 (62)
nd
2 D.I.M (1/44)
578 (19)
2,329 (29)
114 (0)
3,021 (48)
rd
3 D.I.A (2/44)
264 (22)
1,280 (37)
547 (5)
2,091 (64)
1st D.M.I. (5-6/44)
673 (49)
2,066 (117)
- (-)
2,066 (166)
(Note: Officer casualties are in parentheses)
chapter three there was a basic description of a division given, which normally contained
three rifle regiments, an artillery regiment, and a few battalions of troops such as
engineers, medical, or reconnaissance. For a regiment of North African Tirailleurs, the
total number of officers was ninety-two under ideal – when all officers are present –
conditions; and it was at the regimental level that most of the casualties of a division were
150
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taken. Multiplying ninety-two by three, the number of regiments within a division, and
using the sixty-two officers who were casualties in the 2nd D.I.M. in 1943, then slightly
more than twenty-two percent of the officers within the regiments became casualties. 152
The casualty toll for this same division in January 1944 was 3,021 men: 578 dead
(nineteen officers); 2,329 wounded (twenty-nine officers); 114 missing (Table 1).
Officer losses for the total amount of men was not even two percent, but using the same
factors to find officer losses, forty-eight officers killed or wounded out of a total of 276
officers in the three regiments, losses among officers now amounted to over seventeen
percent. 153 The 3rd D.I.A., in ten days of combat during February 1944, took 2,091
casualties: 264 dead (twenty-two officers); 1280 wounded (thirty-seven officers); 547
missing (five officers), and officers were slightly more than three percent of the total
losses (Table 1). 154 Among officers the numbers were over twenty-three percent. The 1st
D.M.I., from 11 May to 20 June 1944, lost 2066 men: 673 dead (forty-nine officers),
2066 wounded (117 officers), and officer losses were over eight percent (Table 1). 155
The losses among officers, though, was staggering since that number was over sixty
percent! Obviously officers were no longer willing to remain in the rear, hoping that the
battles were following their plans. One example illustrates this point succinctly:
The force was under the command of General Monsabert, the commander of 3
Algerian Division, and, given Sevez’s disappointing progress, he would have
been quite justified in holding it back throughout the 12th. But he of all people
was fully aware of just how desperate Juin was for some sort of early success …
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he decided to commit his task for in a full-scale attack. Instead of waiting for
Castelforte to fall off the vine, he resolved to pluck it. … But the fighting has
been dour, and at moments of crisis only the remarkable leadership of certain
officers had kept the attack going – men such as Capitaine Louisot, who lost
patience when one group of tanks and infantry hung back in the face of a wellplaced anti-tank gun. ‘Louisot went to walk ahead of the tanks. He went to
advance unprotected against that 88mm gun. 156
The question then becomes what plan were they following?
General Juin issued many battle plans for the eight months that his FEC fought in
Italy, beginning in December 1943. The lessons that he shared with his unit commanders
after the winter battles were simple:
In order to allow the attacker to exploit, he should not be restrained. He should
not be tied to plans or to rigid schedules. Nor to the objective that he cannot
exceed without order, nor the subordination of an advance to another advance
under the pretext that it depends on the principal effort. In war all efforts
contribute to the success of a unit, which will bring success to another.
This manner of attacking implies decentralization in order to make it possible for
the commander, who sees and feels, to exploit …
The commanders of regiments or tactical groupings must have, within the
framework of their mission, a broad initiative … 157
While these thoughts were not replicas of the German approach to World War II warfare,
they were the antithesis of the la bataille conduite. No longer following a rigid timetable,
an attack can proceed past a stated objective and targets of opportunities taken if the
possibility exists for success. And if the main attack falters, success anywhere on the
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battlefield will be supported since the commander on the spot can make the decision to
alter the plan, because he is at or near the front line and sees the attack progressing,
knowing he has the tacit approval of his commander as well as General Juin. This is not
a return to the “cult of the offensive,” a reference to the French approach to World War I
(influenced by the French defeat in 1870-71), but an understanding that Sun Tzu was
correct about war being an art, and not a science; one can train for war, but the intelligent
commander understands that the “fog of war” prevents any plan from continuing until
some changes are made that reflect the current battlefield realities. 158 Juin understood
that the local commanders needed to “feel” the progression of the battle, requiring them
to be at or near the front, to take advantage of opportunities that will quickly disappear if
they are not there and ready to react. Furthermore, the willingness to take chances, such
as those by General Monsabert at Castelforte, might also have been the need for Juin and
his commanders to prove that Afrique officers were the equal of their metropolitan
counterparts – as well as loyal to de Gaulle in wanting to give the French a victory.
Regardless, the examination of leadership losses does suggest that Juin did not follow the
methodical battle doctrine, but do these large losses among the officers also suggest that
there was a return to “cult of the offensive” in Italy – sending his men against prepared
German positions?
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The evidence seems to suggest that Juin did not, and like the German army in
1940, Juin was seeking a war of movement – Bewegungskrieg. Graham and Bidwell, in
their classic study of the Italian campaign, found that:
Juin’s plan in outline was to break through, capture the pass at Esperia on the run
and advancing on as wide a front as possible and seize control of the second
lateral, Highway No, 82; but it must be understood that though that was his
objective, possession of a piece of useful ground was not his object: that was the
vulnerable right-rear of the German Tenth Army. He intended to lever apart the
Gustav Line and so free the 2nd Corps, the (FEC) and the Eighth Army to form a
mass of manoeuvre for the break-out and the march on Rome. This was a bold
operation concept, but it is perhaps understandable that both Alexander and Clark
and their respective staffs looked at it rather doubtfully. Neither man possessed
the strategical insight that distinguished Juin from “les bons chefs ordinaires”, but
they could at least see that it did not detract from the DIADEM plan … 159
John Ellis, one of England’s leading military historians in the 1980s, found that in
addition to the French attacks being, “shining example of the science of command …
(and) attacks consistently pressed home with the greatest panache,” Juin’s officers also
understood how to defeat a German defensive position:
Admittedly the Germans rarely actually pushed Eighth Army units back but they
almost always caused them to halt and methodically regroup for a renewed attack,
during which time the Germans could also reorganize and fall back without undue
interference to the next defensible line. But this was not the French style. Once
they had fought off a counter-attack they pressed forward on the heels of the
retreating Germans, often infiltrating round their flanks along seemingly
impossible mountain tracks, and gave them no opportunity to halt and regroup.
Various German sources testified to the remarkable abilities of the French and
their success in keeping their adversaries continually on the hop. 160
Ellis, Graham/Bidwell, and Major Hinson all find that French officers were operating in a
very aggressive maner in 1944, that they were following the guidelines that Juin had
established for the operations; and the losses among the white officers, found in French
official histories of the campaign, do corroborate what these authors describe. This
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chapter began by asking if part of the FEC’s effectiveness was on account of French
leadership, and the evidence suggests that it was. The FEC was not following a
methodical plan, but a plan that evolved so officers could take advantage of German
tactical procedures: after a German counterattack, the French were quick to follow and
not allow the Germans to establish another strong, defensive position. And if the
expectations of the troops required white Frenchmen to lead by example, and take
casualties in the process, then Juin was willing to accept the losses for the military gain.
He was, however, no less demanding on his riflemen, who is this case were primarily the
indigenous soldiers from Africa.
Although the losses among the officers, described above, were high, it must be
understood that the remainder of the losses, the greatest in sheer numbers of lives, were
primarily among the combat troops recruited in Africa. Each French division ideally –
again, before the unit engages the enemy – entered combat with over 16,000 men: the 1st
D.M.I. with 17,250 men; the 2nd D.I.M. with 16,840; the 3rd D.I.A. also with 16,840 men,
and the 4th D.M.M. with 20,450 men. 161 But of these 16,000+ men, only 3,250 were in
the combat squads and platoons: three squads plus a small headquarters unit equals one
platoon (forty men); three platoons equal one company (120 men); three companies equal
one battalion (360 men); three battalions equal one regiment (1080 men), and three
regiments equal one division (3240 men). In effect, there are 243 squads in a division,
multiplied by twelve men, which equals 2916 men. The difference between 2916 and
3250 is on account of the inclusion of eight men in the headquarters unit at the platoon
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level – these men were usually right on the front line helping to direct the squads. The
rest of men in the division – at least over 13,000 men – were there to support these men
who were killing the enemy with the rifle and bayonet. And while technically every man
within a division was a target of the enemy, historically it has been the men in the rifle
squads who incur the majority of a division's casualties when combat was joined since
they were called upon to move within eyesight of the enemy.
To illustrate this point about the vulnerability of the infantry, both the American
and British armies severely underestimated the number of infantry casualties that their
rifle battalions would suffer in Normandy during the summer of 1944 since both
countries were basing their projections on the combat losses from North Africa, where
losses among the service troops was higher since the desert does not shield troops located
a few thousand meters behind the front line. The type of terrain in Normandy, the
bocage, favored the defender since he was impossible to see until only a few meters
separated the troops. That being the case:
Of the British forces in Normandy by August 1944, 56 per cent were classified as
fighting troops rather than service elements … Even within an infantry battalion,
a man serving heavy weapons with the support company possessed a markedly
greater chance of survival than his counterpart in a rifle company. It was here that
the losses, the turnover of officers and men, became appalling, for more serious
than the planners had allowed for, and eventually reached crisis proportion in
Normandy for the American, German and British armies. Before D-Day, the
American logisticians had expected 70.3 per cent of their casualties to be among
infantry. Yet in the event, of 100,000 American casualties in June and July, 85
per cent were infantry, 63 per cent riflemen. 162
The terrain in Italy was no better for the attacker than the bocage in Normandy since the
defender could bring down artillery fire upon him, and the attacker could do little more
than try to close and kill (or rout) the men who were spotting and directing the artillery,
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and artillery accounted for over half the battle casualties incurred by all the combatants
during the World War II (and in some campaigns, such as Normandy, artillery inflicted
over seventy percent of the Allied casualties). 163
Therefore, in an attempt not to overstate the casualties in the rifle platoons, and to
bring it more in line with the eighty-five percent casualty figure (used by Hastings) for
the overall infantry figure listed above, an additional 1,450 soldiers, those men located in
the heavy weapon platoons and heavy weapon company within each battalion (who are
also in close proximity to enemy), are added to the 3,250 riflemen in the rifle platoons.
The number of men at greatest risk per division is now approximately 4,700. 164
Returning to the casualty list (Table 1), in twenty-one days of combat during
December 1943 the 2nd D.I.M. took 923 casualties: 211 dead, 656 wounded, and fifty-six
missing. If eighty-five percent of those casualties are in the rifle squads and heavy
weapon units in the attacking battalions, or approximately 785 men, then nearly
seventeen percent of the 4,700 have become casualties. The losses for this same division
in January 1944 were 3,021 men: 578 dead, 2,329 wounded, and 114 missing. If eightyfive percent of those men are considered, equaling 2,568 men, now the percentage of
those 4,700 men becoming casualties is nearly fifty-five percent. A realistic assumption
would be that in slightly less than two months the 2nd D.I.M. has had over seventy
percent of the men at the sharp end, those men in the rifle platoons and heavy weapon
units, becoming casualties! The 3rd D.I.A., in ten days of combat during February 1944,
163

I.C.B. Dear, editor, Oxford Companion to World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 57.

Hastings, Overlord, 188.
164

Three heavy weapon platoons per battalion (twenty-nine men) among nine battalions adds an additional

783 men; and one heavy weapon company per battalion (seventy-four men in the machine-gun platoons)
among nine battalions adds an additional 666 men. These men total approximately 1449.

70

took 2,091 casualties: 264 dead, 1280 wounded, and 547 missing. In this case almost
thirty-eight percent of the 4,700 men became casualties. The 1st D.M.I., from 11 May to
20 June 1944, lost 2066 men: 673 dead and 2066 wounded. Like the 3rd D.I.A., losses
were slightly more than thirty-seven percent. After a few battles, these divisions would
be completely new units at the squad level.
To put these numbers into perspective, Paul Gaujac, Le Corps Expeditionnaire
Français En Italie, 1943-1944, broke down the number of men who were killed (per
1,000 men) or who became casualties, not missing or captured: “Taking for a base of
1,000 men in one year, it is possible to compare the proportion of killed and those lost for
health reasons in Italy and the 1st French Army.” 165 For the FEC, the number of killed
per 1,000 was 150 men, and those men who were wounded added another 570 men. In a
comparison with the United States 5th Army, which the FEC served under, the American
army lost eighty-nine killed per 1000 with another 280 wounded. 166 In effect, a soldier in
the FEC stood a sixty percent greater chance of being killed than if he was in the 5th
Army, and more than twice as likely to be wounded.
Using the statistics provided by these two authors, Boulle and Gaujac, the FEC
did suffer large casualties at the sharp end, among both officers and the infantry. A final
question is could France have done more with its white manpower? As was stated
earlier, the total manpower of the divisions at full-strength was nearly 17,000. The very
nature of World War II combat guaranteed that there was a huge organization within and
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behind each division making sure that needed supplies were available when required, that
the soldiers were well taken care of when injured, or that they had a place to relax when
not on the front line. These troops were normally called service troops, and they were
just as important as the men at the front, but they were normally never called upon to
fight. Prime Minister Churchill called these men the “tail” and he was in a constant battle
with the military in trying to get the tail shortened and the number of “teeth” – combat
troops – increased. The French military that existed in North Africa after November
1942 would surely echo Churchill’s remarks: de Gaulle knew that if France was to regain
some of the military prestige it had lost in 1940, the surest way was on the battlefields of
Italy (and eventually France), and not by creating service units. Therefore, the French
military was in a constant struggle with the United States in trying to get the maximum
number of divisions formed with the fewest number of the service troops. To the French
officers making these decisions, either more combat or service troops, the reasoning was
very simple: they did not have enough white Frenchmen since millions of men were still
in Germany as prisoners of war from 1940, many tens of thousands were forced to work
in Germany, or they were just still in occupied France. Regardless, they could not help
de Gaulle and his new army. But why were white Frenchmen so important?
Mann explains this by illustrating what he refers to as the “cultural education,” a
central part of their training, which made the men Tirailleurs. Mann writes:
Raw recruits arriving at Kati had no knowledge of military practices of rank and
discipline … Especially in the first decades of the twentieth century, hardly any
conscripts spoke or understood French, and many spoke little or no Bamanankan,
the lingua franca of the corps. Nothing came easily. Modern rifles were often
new to them, but so were shoes, trucks, inoculations, clocks, and virtually every
other aspect of French military culture. 167
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Now this description is for the Sénégalais, but most likely this could apply to the recruits
from North Africa. These men could only learn so much in a training cycle, and the
French military would most likely focus on training the men to be soldiers, rather than
spending time on education. White Frenchmen had an advantage since they most likely
had some education, it was assumed that they could at least read and write in French (an
African recruit might be literate in Arabic, but that did not make him literate to the white
Frenchmen), and were therefore given the positions within the army that required the use
of education. But as Mann states, even if an African had an education, he still faced
problems in a French military where most Africans were just considered illiterate, a
prejudiced belief imbedded in the colonial ideology:
Conscripted as a medical student in 1942, Jospehy Issoufou Conombo confronted
a different set of problems: a mud bench where he had anticipated a bed with a
mosquito net; soup in which worms swam; and NCOs shouting orders in a French
that was far less correct than his own. 168
This one example illustrates the complex issues of French colonialism: a medical student
being used as a common foot soldier because he is black.
After the Allies invaded North Africa in November 1942, the Armée d’Afrique
quickly swelled from 137,000 men, which the Germans had eventually allowed for North
African defense, to over 315,000 men. 169 This is a large number of available men, but it
was not enough when contrasted with French military ambitions. General Henri Giraud,
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commander of the Armée d’Afrique, wanted an army of eight divisions from these
315,000 men, and not including the Free French division serving with the British. Eight
divisions multiplied by 17,000 men, the average number of men in a division, only equals
136,000 men, which was far less than 315,000. The problem lies in what the military
calls the divisional slice.
The divisional slice is comprised of the total number men within the division plus
the number of troops involved in maintaining that division in the field, i.e. those men in
the corps, army, army group, and communications zone troops. The normal divisional
slice for an American division in Europe was 40,000 men: 15,000 in the division, 15,000
in the corps and army troops, and 10,000 communications zone troops. This is very
complicated for a French division because not only must forty percent of the men inside
the division be white, placed in positions of leadership as well as specialists in a variety
of positions, but a large number of the men in the remaining slice – those additional
25,000 men (15,000 corps plus the 10,000 communications zone troops) – would also
need to be white, and for that reason de Gaulle’s military command was constantly trying
to lower the number of those service units that required so many white Frenchmen.
Marcel Vigneras, in Rearming the French, therefore entitles on the sections of his book
“La Bataille des Services.” It was a battle the French could not win since the number of
white Frenchman (eventually numbering 250,000 men from all over the empire), men
who were trusted to be leaders, cadres, technicians, and specialists, was finite. 170
Multiplying the nine divisions Giraud wanted by the number of men needed in the
divisional slice, then the number of men required is 360,000 men, and of this number
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60,000 men were required to be white Frenchmen. 171 The French military was constantly
being reminded by Washington to create more service units since the United States only
had enough service troops in the Mediterranean for the divisions it had shipped there, but
France did not have the manpower to create large numbers of service units unless it had
been willing to place more Africans in positions that were reserved for white Frenchmen,
something the French military hesitated to do for a number of reasons, including the
ramifications it would have for maintaining the racial hierarchies in the colonial system
after the war. Eventually for Italy, the United States military permitted France to
primarily just send combat troops. 172 Africans would therefore have to provide most of
the manpower at the squad level in the FEC.
In a typical Tirailleur regiment in 1943-44, there was a total of ninety-two
officers, 406 NCOs and 2,612 soldiers – total manpower is 3,110 men. Of that total
manpower, sixty-nine percent was African. While white officers and NCOs were found
at every level, the majority of the Africans were found at the battalion, seventy-four
percent, and company level, seventy-nine percent. 173 For the mountain regiments of the
4th D.M.M., the total number of men in the regiment is 3,943. Overall, Africans made up
seventy-seven percent of the regiment. The numbers for the battalion and company are
171
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seventy-nine and eighty-two percent respectively. The Goum regiment, or Groupe,
contained approximately 2,865 men, and of that total nearly seventy-eight percent were
Moroccan. 174 At the squad level, Africans would provide over ninety percent of the
manpower for all the units listed, Tirailleur, mountain, or Goum. These units just could
not function without Africans.
Returning to the thesis question, why was the FEC so effective in Italy, a few
historians, especially Ellis and Graham/Bidwell, found the FEC’s contribution to the
Allies invaluable; and as mentioned in the introduction, Graham/Bidwell even named a
section of their book “France Wins the Diadem.” The heavy losses suffered by the
individual divisions (Table 1), indicate that the FEC was involved in very intense combat.
Is there evidence, similar to Lunn’s study of World War I, which could link these losses
to a systematic indifference on the part of the FEC’s leadership?
In his study, Clayton mentioned that French officers were required to lead by
example if an attack was going to succeed, and from the statistics generated earlier in this
chapter, white French officers did incur casualties. What did it mean if a unit lost white
officers and NCOs? When Ellis was examining the French war diaries of the divisions
involved, Journaux de Marches et Opérations, that loss is made very clear. 175 Ellis states
that the divisional officers were all too ready to blame their black troops, and in this
instance it was 11 Bataillon de Marche (taken from a Journaux de Marches et
Opérations):
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movements towards the rear as soon as the European cadres were hit or didn’t
handle a difficult situation with sufficient vigour. In the 6th Company, the
incapacitation of the Captain and the longest-serving officer had a serious effect
on the men’s morale. The necessity for a strong leavening of European officers
… was confirmed once more. 176
Furthermore (written by a colonel in the 1DMI – also in the Journaux de Marches et
Opérations):
Black troops obviously do not represent the ideal solution and the fact that the
officers and senior NCOs are always obliged to lead from the front, standing up,
explains the severs losses suffered by these cadres. 177
Ellis, in a footnote, goes to great lengths to make sure that the reader understands that
such remarks were not peculiar to 1DMI, with its large contingent of Senegalese troops.
Ellis states, “though relations between native and Europeans in the Moroccan and
Algerian Divisions were generally good, it would not do to idealize the situation.” 178
Thus a report by the 2e Bureau of 2 DIM, from the Journaux at the end of the forth battle
of Cassino, noted:
We must never forget what experience has taught, that with the mediocre native
troops now at our disposal, night attacks, even limited ones, exact a terrible price
from our French cadres. 179
It is very clear from these war diaries that some French officers thought very little of the
African troops they were commanding. Africans it seemed, in the words of these French
officers, would just suffice since they were “mediocre” troops, but that very dependence
upon these African soldiers caused larger losses among the white Frenchmen leading
them. Most likely some of these French officers resented the fact that the main reason
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they were fighting Germans in Italy was on account of the Africans they were leading,
even if these white officers were forced to “lead from the front, standing up.” In effect,
these reports describe all that was wrong with the French colonial military system. From
General de Rumigny wanting the Kabyles for security duty, General Mangin wanting as
many Senegalese as Africa could send to France in World War I, and that over twenty
percent of the of the French division in 1940 had their origins in Africa, there was a
tradition of making a case for African soldiers in the French military, but when there
were failures, such as the troops being routed at Verdun, the troops were at fault and not
the system that put them in combat.
Earlier, this paper made use of some statistics generated by Gaujac to compare the
casualties found among every 1,000 men. This was used to compare the FEC to the
United States 5th Army. Gaujac, however, also did a comparison made between the FEC
and the 1st French Army that fought in France and Germany. Gaujac found that among
the 1,000 men who became casualties, 150 men killed in the FEC was twice that of the 1st
Army (sixty-nine men killed), and the same was true for being wounded. The question is,
what changed from the FEC to the 1st Army? The general at the top had changed,
General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny replaced General Alphonse Juin, but had his ability to
lead? Douglas Porch, in Path to Victory, stated, “France undoubtedly produced three of
war’s best commanders in Alphonse Juin, Philippe Leclerc de Hautclocque, and Jean de
Lattre de Tassigny.” 180 Of the divisions that fought in the FEC, all were in France as
soon as they could be withdrawn from Italy, as well as the other Afrique divisions that
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had been organized and trained in North Africa. The largest single factor that therefore
seems relevant in comparing the FEC and 1st Army was the “whitening” of the 1st Army
as soon as metropolitan French manpower became available. 181 As de Tassigny
commented on the “whitening” process in his history of the 1st Army:
It was no slight affair. With the D.F.L. (1st D.M.I.) this ‘whitening’ involved five
infantry battalions from the Cameroon, French Equatorial Africa, and Djibouti, as
well as numerous artillery, transport and medical elements, a total of over 6,000
men … with the 9th D.I.C. it was greater still, since it was advisable that 9,200
Senegalese should be relieved and sent without delay to the Midi. 182
The reasoning behind their replacement is:
Finally, the very nature of the land was against us. Accustomed to the rocky
djebels of the Atlas mountains or to the peaks of the Abruzzi, our African soldiers
felt lost in the dark forests, where they found their way with much difficulty and
where death came treacherously when shells bursts in the tops of pine trees. 183
It was materially necessary because our army needed to increase its strength and,
to begin with, to maintain it by making good its losses, by replacing the black
troops unsuited to the winter climate of the east of France and by relieving North
Africa, which had reached the extreme limit of its capabilities.184

De Tassigny’s arguments are circumspect since he knew the troops he was commanding;
he had served as a cavalry officer during the Moroccan Rif campaigns in the 1920s and
was the commander of the Vichy forces in Tunisia in 1941 so he knew his African
soldiers were capable. The statement about African troops being unsuited for the winter
climate is quite absurd since France sent the equivalent of three divisions to fight in Italy
during November and December of 1943. The one thing that did change from Italy to
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France was the composition of the two formations, and the composition was the number
of Africans and Europeans after the initial Allied landings and the military had regained
access to white Frenchmen. To further stress this point, de Tassigny writes in his
conclusion that:
For the French alone the number of dead represents about 7.25 per 1000 of the
total number engaged (295,000) and wounded 2.5 percent. Taking into
consideration the results obtained and the battle conditions, there figures are quite
light. They even remain clearly less than those which the statistics of losses since
1943, relating to breakthrough operations, show. 185
De Tassigny clearly states that the losses of the French 1st Army were not equal to those
of the FEC – “losses since 1943.” The United States stressed that what the French army
needed was an increase in service troops, but no more combat troops. France did
increase the number of service troops, but it also replaced many of the African solders
with white Frenchmen. And when it did so, the losses it suffered lessened accordingly.
From the information provided by Ellis, taken from the Journaux de Marches et
Opérations, a French colonial military mindset did exist in the French army during World
War II. De Tassigny was using aspects of scientific racism for his history of the French
1st Army, but his selection of criteria is suspect since General Mangin found that African
soldiers had the ability to live in harsher climates since they a less developed nervous
system (when compared to whites) – they could resist pain. De Tassigny states the
opposite: African soldiers were not only unsuited to cooler climates, and Africa had
reached the limit of its resources. These seem to only be excuses to remove African
soldiers from having any further participation in France’s liberation. While the
“mediocre native troops” – and mediocre only for the French military since these native
troops had performed very well – had served their part in Italy, since France had no other
185
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choice for its divisions in Italy, in France they had another choice. White soldiers could
be used to liberate France – “young Frenchmen [needed to] be given a taste of
victory.” 186 As Myron Echenberg states, “Now, when the spoils of victory were about to
be theirs, they were suddenly being told that their services were no longer required, and
in a manner which, to a fighting soldier, must have seen greatly humiliating.” 187 These
men were unceremoniously pulled out of the front-line, forced to give up their arms (and
sometimes their uniforms) and given little, if any, recognition for all they had done for
France. France could not have been player, even a minor one at that, at the end of the
war without African soldiers. 188
Using the statistics generated by Boulle, and adjusted for this study, Africans took
huge losses in the battles for Italy. Gaujac shows the relationship between the United
States 5th Army, the FEC, and the 1st French Army; the FEC took very large losses when
compared to the United States 5th but the 1st French took far fewer than FEC. Therefore,
the only logical conclusion to be reached is that French leadership in Italy was willing to
use African soldiers aggressively, and accepted the losses that came from their aggressive
tactics since they were Africans, not white Frenchmen, who were taking the losses.
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CHAPTER FOUR: A FRENCH VICTORY?
The previous chapters have contained few descriptions about the actual battles
that occurred in the nine months that the FEC was in Italy. While Cassino, Salerno, and
Anzio are the battles that most historians remember, even if they just have a cursory
knowledge of the Allied campaign in Italy, the battles at Belvedere, Castelforte, and
Monte Faito should also be known but are generally just footnotes in most of the English
language history books on the Italian campaign. Monte Faito, in particular, should be
better known since its capture forced the Germans to completely abandon the Gustav
Line, which then allowed the Allies to enter Rome just two days before the Western
Allies invaded France at Normandy. Monte Faito was in some ways the German Sedan
in Italy, but in this instance it was men, rather than the machines, that won the battle. 189
When General Juin first entered Italy on 25 November 1943, his reception
amounted to the crew at the airfield and his closest staff members who made the flight
with him: “While waiting until a telephone call alerted the French mission at the U.S. 5th
Army, General Juin patiently remained on the chilly aircraft.” 190 His exit from Italy on
21 July 1944 could not have been more different. British General Harold Alexander,
commander of all forces in the Mediterranean, personally drove Juin to the airport:
“General Alexander then steps toward his jeep, requesting the general (Juin) and his chief
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of staff (Carpentier) to sit there.” 191 In Juin’s hand were letters of praise and thanks from
General Alexander and General Clark. 192 The FEC had proved much to the other Allies,
particularly General Montgomery since he suggested that all the French military was
good for was guarding airports. 193 But to achieve that success, the FEC paid a frightful
cost in men – primarily African men – killed in action.
No existing historical account provides a complete breakdown of overall
casualties, regarding white Frenchmen and Africans, so this thesis will have to
interpolate. 194 Of the 3,250 men (see page 68) in the combat squads and platoons, those
men who were closest to the enemy, only 405 of these men would be French officers or
NCOs, which is only slightly more than twelve percent. 195 The remainder of the white
Frenchmen would be found in all the specialist positions of the company. Regarding the
additional 1,450 men in the heavy weapon platoons and companies, another 279 white
Frenchmen were added, which is almost twenty percent. 196 Overall, approximately 684
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men out of the 4,700 were white Frenchmen, which was fifteen percent. Returning to the
casualty percentages described by Hastings, if eighty-five percent of the casualties within
a division were in the rifle squads, and of those men eighty-five percent were African,
overall over seventy-two percent of the divisions casualties in the rifle squads were
among the Africans. 197 And of the men that become casualties throughout the rest of the
division, the remaining fifteen percent, white Frenchmen would still be only a fraction
since Africans averaged sixty percent of the total manpower within the divisions of the
FEC. 198 Since African soldiers still occupied many of the positions that would be
exposed to the enemy, those other positions within the regiment closest to the enemy but
not on the front line (delivering supplies, removing wounded, etc.), it is assumed that they
incurred over half of the remaining fifteen percent. While this figure is only an educated
guess, if it is accurate then over eighty percent of the casualties taken by a division would
be African soldiers, when at most they represented only sixty percent of a divisions total
manpower.

are nine battalions, so that total is 144 men. Combined, the overall total is 279 men. Again, these are the
men closest to the enemy. These figures do omit the headquarter units for the heavy weapon platoons and
companies. These men would are close to the enemy, but not directly firing upon the enemy with weapons,
which is then reciprocated with enemy fire. These men were omitted when deriving the 1,450 and there is
no reason to include them here.
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Between November 1943 and August 1944, over 32,500 men of the FEC became
casualties (Table 2). These casualties amount to almost two complete divisions worth of
Table 2 Casualties Of The FEC In Italy Compared To 1940
Campaign:
Dead:
Wounded:
Missing:
FEC in Italy
6,500
24,000
2,000
1940
90-100,000
210,000
All POWs
FEC (adjusted)
130,000
480,000
N.A.

Total Casualties:
32,500
N.A.
N.A.

men – two divisions entered the campaign with 16,840 men. If the killed and missing are
combined, a total of 8,500 men, and then compared to the 4,700 men that do most of the
dying in any division, again there are two divisions worth of the manpower that France
needed to replace. 199 To put these losses into perspective, total French casualties for the
six-week 1940 campaign are between 90-100,000 men killed and approximately 210,000
wounded, but out of a total of 2,200,000 men – organized into over one hundred divisions
– defending the north of France facing Germany. The FEC, at its greatest strength in
manpower, amounted to approximately 110,000 men, or 1/20th of the total manpower of
the 1940 army. By multiplying the actual casualties in Italy by twenty, this paper arrives
at the adjusted casualty figures that are shown in Table 2 - line 3. To analyze the
casualties another way, Table 3 compares the two campaigns as a simple percentage.
Table 3 French Casualties As A Percentage Of Total Men Involved
Campaign:
Dead:
Percentage: Wounded:
Percentage:
FEC in Italy (110,000)
6,500
5.9 %
24,000
21.8%
1940 (2,200,000)
90-100,000
4.5 %
210,000
9.5%
Note: As the percentage of dead in 1940, 100,000 is used. If the number was closer to
90,000, then the percentage drops to 4.1 %.
Furthermore, not all of the FEC divisions in the campaign were there for ten months, so
for many months the strength of the FEC was approximately 60,000 men. Initially only
two divisions were in battle during November, along with two regiments of Goums that
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reached the front in December. A third division entered Italy in February, as well as the
third Goum regiment, and the fourth division arrived in April. The 2nd D.I.M. and 3rd
D.I.A., as would be expected since they were engaged the longest, received the largest
share of the casualties since they were in Italy the longest. One of the Goum regiments,
the 4th, suffered so heavily, over fifty percent casualties, it was sent back to Morocco to
recover. 200 The preceding paragraph figures that Africans took over eighty percent of the
casualties in Italy, while this paragraph illustrates that the fighting in Italy was very
intense with a large percentage of casualties for the divisions in comparison to 1940. But
no matter how willingly General Juin might accept manpower losses, he knew that he
could not just throw his men at the enemy and expect to win the battles. He had to find
another way.
As Ellis and Graham/Bidwell both stated, the biggest impact of the FEC was its
reliance upon speed, surprise, and never giving the Germans a chance to regroup and
counterattack, which was what the German defensive doctrine was built upon:
The essential point is to travel as fast as possible. … Once the breakthrough phase
in completed … it will be necessary … to be as aggressive as possible, to tie
down only the minimum of forces to guard the most important points, and not
…to hold on to captured positions, but to manoeuvre within the defined zone of
action and seek out the enemy and attack him, making further resistance pointless
in the shortest possible time. 201
Moving, however, does not mean that that the French just avoided the German defensive
positions. Some positions had to be taken, and it was those battles that cost the FEC over
30,000 casualties.
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To return to the theme of “other” histories introduced on the introduction, both
forgotten or analyzed improperly, Douglas Porch, Path to Victory, provides the perfect
example of this. Porch, like this thesis, also used the numbers provided by Boulle in his
chapter on the French, but then confused the German prisoners taken by the FEC – over
8,000 captured by the French – as French prisoners and the actual number of French
captured and missing as just the FEC missing. 202 In effect Porch added 8,000 more
casualties to the FEC, which were already high. 203 To further confuse any study of the
FEC in Italy, at least an English language examination, Clayton uses the numbers of 587
European and 1307 indigenous, a total of 1,894, for the casualty figures for the 3rd D.I.A.
in Italy. 204 But what do these numbers mean? Are these numbers killed and missing,
those being a complete loss to the division, or is it some other combination of numbers?
Total numbers from Boulle, for the 3rd D.I.A., are 1,068 killed, 4,529 wounded, and 679
missing for a total of 6,276. Adding the number of killed and missing from Boulle, the
number is 1,747. This is close to Clayton’s number, but do they represent the same
number? If Clayton does not explain what these numbers represent, they mean nothing.
Likewise, Boulle’s numbers are more exact, but they only tell a part of the history.
Boulle tells the reader a history of the Italian campaign, but it is a French history, not a
history of the African involvement in Italy on behalf of France. The losses Boulle states
are more than just French losses because they are mostly African losses. In effect, Boulle
was marginalizing the role of African soldiers in Italy. Much like the comments made by
French officers in the Journaux de Marches et Opérations, when there were failures on
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the battlefield – or excessive officer losses – it was on account of the soldiers being
African, but success, such as the taking of Castelforte by Capitaine Louisot, were on
account of the excellent leadership provided by white Frenchmen. Mark Twain’s
comment on statistics, “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics,”
seem particularly relevant in trying to determine the supreme effort put forth by Africans
of the FEC in Italy. 205
Taking statistics one step further, Ellis states that the numbers of French
casualties during 11 May to 5 June 1944, the beginning of Operation Diadem to the
capture of Rome, are 1,751 killed, 7,912 wounded, and 972 missing; these numbers are
consistent in all the studies. When divided by the number of combat battalions available
to the French, Ellis uses forty-five, which is accurate if using the Goum equivalent
battalions (but ignoring the French tank and tank-destroyer battalions that did incur
combat losses), the percentage of casualties among the French combat companies is
slightly over thirty-two percent. Interestingly, the United States numbers are 20,024 total
casualties (which is actually 1,000 less than it should be – Ellis must have added wrong)
among sixty-six battalions (again, no additions for the American tank and tank-destroyer
battalions), for a casualty rate of over forty-one percent. There are two problems with
this number. First, does Ellis consider that the United States kept feeding replacements
into the combat divisions as the battle continued? This practice allowed the United States
to keep fighting with its very limited amount of combat divisions formed during the war.
The other major combatants in the war, Great Britain (and its empire troops), Germany,
and the Soviet Union, pulled divisions out of the front line to absorb replacements. If
205
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not, then the two are not equal comparisons. In the study by Ernest Fisher, Cassino to the
Alps (1977), which is part of the United States Army Green Series, Fisher states that:
Yet on 4 June, thanks to a well-functioning replacement system, the Fifth Army’s
strength was at a peak that it had not reached before, nor would again – an
effective strength of 369,356, which included 231,306 Americans, 95,142 French
(mostly Algerians and Moroccans), and 42,908 British. 206
This peak, which Boulle also quotes, only counts those men who are listed as “effective,”
meaning combat ready or able to do their job. And this peak was reached after the United
States had lost over 21,000 men. Therefore, the American percentage – according to
Ellis – can not be as high as the French, which would then only be bested by Polish
percentage loss of forty-two. 207 Second, both Boulle and Ellis were using inflated Fifth
Army casualties – the 21,024 – when generating some of their tables and charts. From
the Fisher study, the number is closer to 18,000 men: 3,145 killed, 13,704 wounded, and
1,082 missing; Boulle and Ellis are using numbers of 3,667 killed, 16,153 wounded, and
1,204 missing – as stated a few sentences ago, Ellis added wrong since he was only using
20,024. Determining these overall American losses is only done for this paper as a
comparison to show the tenacity of the French in trying to close with the enemy, and their
willingness to be killed, wounded, or captured in the process; with only forty-one percent
of the American effectives (95,142 to 231,306), the French took nearly sixty percent of
the United States casualties (10,635 to 17,931). The French fought in Italy, but
regardless of the casualties that the FEC suffered, the real difficulties are trying to
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determine the number of white Europeans killed, wounded, and missing as compared to
Africans killed, wounded, and missing. The studies just do not break the numbers down
to show the discrepancy between white Frenchmen and African, but how could they if the
French military did not during the war? But what if the military had kept more precise
statistics? One result might have been the lack of need for this thesis: the FEC was very
willing to spend the lives of Africans for France. Another outcome would be the real
debt owned to Africa by France, rather than de Gaulle sending his troops back to Africa –
“whitening” – as quickly as possible to keep the belief of a great French empire alive in
the colonies. This thesis is just a beginning to show how important Africans were to the
overall French military effort in the last two years of the war. France needed Africans,
and the numbers of Africans killed, wounded, and missing needs to be known by more
than just a few French historians, or authors writing in English but providing the wrong
information (or using the wrong information to make their point).
One of the goals of this thesis was, however, to determine if there was a strong
willingness by French officers expend African lives in combat. The evidence found for
this paper, at least in Italy, is an affirmative. Was that willingness based on a colonial
mindset? Again, the answer is an affirmative. Another study by a French author
highlights the disparity of coverage between white Frenchmen and African soldiers.
Jacques Robichon, in Les Français en Italie, examines the campaign from the
perspectives of the soldiers at the tip of the French spear. Examples of this approach are
spread throughout the chapters. Robichon mentions names during many of the
engagements, “despair for the officers shot, which dispatched them - Lieutenant Stefani,
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NCO Girard, Lieutenant de Villèle.” 208 Robichon also makes mention of the losses of
officers:
Dead by the enemy … Roux, colonel. Baluze, Carré, Châtillon, Goiffon, Isaac,
Jean, Tixier, captains. Prisoner … Berne commander of the battalion … In total,
fifteen officers dead, 160 NCOs, 1200 corporals and riflemen dead, wounded, or
missing. For the 4th R.T.T. alone. 209
These samples do show that white Frenchmen were leading in battle, and taking losses
for it, but they also illustrate something more. Where are the names of the African
soldiers killed, wounded, missing? Africans are only included in the catchall, “1200
corporals and riflemen.” Thirty-five years after the event, since Robichon wrote his book
in the late 1970s, the African contribution is still only partially told since Robichon
focuses more squarely on the role that white Frenchmen played in the campaign, while
the indigenous soldiers are mentioned only occasionally by name. This reader wondered
what the African soldiers had to accomplish to be included in Robichon’s study since
they were the soldiers most often face-to-face with the enemy. A colonial mindset
existed during the war and has continued many years later.
But what of the Africans that Robichon does mention: “Il est mort … et Boukhrit
Kadda, Kiali Salah, Ben Kirour?” 210 As this thesis has shown the importance of the FEC
has been seemingly lost to history, in both English language versions as well as French,
and even followers of World War II history, but it is especially so for the Africans who
participated in the campaign. John Ellis wrote in Cassino that another book published a
208
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few years earlier by Jacques Robichon, Les Français en Italie that was just examined
above, cited a French war correspondent in Italy who wrote in 1946 that, “And those who
died in Italy are asking me why France has forgotten them.” 211 Only recently has France
tried to answer this question.
In 2006, a group of Beurs (French popular term for French of North African
origin) released the motion picture Indigènes, titled Days of Glory in the United States. 212
On both the World War II and H-War listservs, there were groups of individuals who
began asking about the numbers of French, African and European, who participated in
the later stages of the war. Many members of these lists were completely unaware of the
African component in the FEC, and later the 1st French Army. In the final few scenes of
the movie, the last African soldier left alive, the others killed in action defeating a
German attack, is completely ignored when a French cameraman finally decides to take a
picture of French soldiers in the village. The cameraman is, in fact, taking a picture of
white soldiers brandishing their arms – the true hero of the battle is completely out of the
picture. Furthermore, the treatment of black Africans released by “whitening” often did
not dramatically improve their situation, either in relation to getting back to Africa or
their relationships with the French military hierarchy. Some of the black ex-POWs,
liberated by the Allied advance through France, were rounded up to work in military
labor units. 213 Eventually, all these released servicemen were grouped into six centers in
France. While white ex-POWs were quickly issued back pay and discharged, black
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Africans often had to wait for their pay and embarkation to Africa – some waited over a
year to return. 214 The Africans, and their contributions, were purposely made invisible
during the war, and in many ways this state has remained until the present. But
thankfully, this has changed recently.
The difficulties between France and its soldiers began even before the war ended,
but became a true issue for Africans during the decolonization of Africa after the war
ended. The riots of black Africans in 1944-45 often grew out of the unequal and inferior
treatment of them in comparison to their fellow white soldiers. 215 And after 1950, when
the French National Assembly voted to accept the principle of equal rights for equal
sacrifices, “most African veterans reaffirmed their loyalties to the State that paid their
pensions” (as if they had much choice if they wanted what was owned them). 216 The
problems of decolonization and the soldiers began when France – under de Gaulle –
voted to freeze African pension payments to soldiers from countries no longer under
French rule (benefits were placed at 1959 levels). France could claim that it was
honoring its commitments to its veterans since they were still being given a pension.
However, over a period of forty years, the value of the France’s payments to its African
soldiers was approximately thirty percent (if not less) of what their French counterparts
received. 217 While the French Council of State, France’s highest administrative count,
decided in 2001 that France’s overseas veterans should receive the same pension as a
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French national (as well as additional money to cover the previous unfair payments), little
was done by the French government to begin these payments. 218 This changed when
French President Jacques Chirac saw a screening of Indigènes. He finally chose to have
France adjust the soldier’s pensions upwards to allow some of these men – approximately
85,000 still alive in 2006 when Native Sons was first published – to no longer live in
poverty.
This thesis had two goals: to illustrate how France managed to send an army to
fight in Italy and explain why were the troops that France managed to send to Italy so
effective once they were there. It became a paper on the French colonial mindset because
that is where the evidence led. The FEC was a French and African army that fought in
Italy, but also an army of Africans that little is known about except for a very few
informed historians. They were the men at the sharp end: the men doing the killing but
also doing most of the dying. After all the research completed for this paper, the
conclusion is that this thesis is just a beginning. More work must be done on this topic if
a balanced history of France’s involvement in the war is ever going to be written. But
more importantly, a balanced history also means that not only is credit given to the
African soldiers who fought for France in World War II, but that the colonial system they
fought under must also be explained to illustrate the shortcomings of the French empire.
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